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I. INTRODUCTION
The imposition of taxes generally fosters an intense ambition on the
part of those individuals adversely affected by such taxes to seek
means of avoidance. Tax practitioners, wishing to capitalize on such
desires, search for and discover loopholes within the tax law that can
be utilized for the purpose of tax avoidance. One loophole commonly
used to avoid the imposition of estate and gift tax is a "Crummey
Trust."' This Comment will explore the nature of such'trusts, their con-
sistency with policies underlying the estate and gift tax laws, and their
harmony with controlling precedent. Furthermore, this Comment will
test the boundaries of the utility of such trusts. Finally, this Comment
will undertake an analysis of the gift and estate tax ramifications on the
beneficiaries of such trusts in order to ascertain the usefulness of this
device as an effective loophole.
A. Background
1. Evolution of Estate and Gift Tax Laws
The estate tax is the common method by which the federal govern-
ment imposes a tax on the transfer of property upon an individual's
death.2 Contrary to previous methods of estate taxation, the present
1. This device is named after the case in which the technique was initially recog-
nized: Crummey v. Commissioner, 397 F.2d 82 (9th Cir. 1968). A Crummey Trust is
created when the settlor of a trust grants the beneficiary a right to demand all or
part of the trust's income or corpus. See infra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
2. Section 2001 of the Internal Revenue Code (the Code) imposes a tax on the
[Vol. 21: 83, 19931 Crummey Trusts
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
estate tax is levied upon the estate of the decedent rather than upon
the recipient of the estate.' This tax is computed by multiplying the tax-
able estate by the applicable tax rate.'
Social and fiscal policies were the underlying incentives for the enact-
ment of the estate tax laws.5 Society profited from the imposition of
such taxes through the prevention of the undue accumulation of
wealth.' Fiscal objectives were fulfilled by utilizing estate tax revenues
to finance government expenditures, such as military exigencies How-
ever, the revenues raised from estate taxes remain insignificant in com-
parison to revenues raised from other forms of taxation.8 Thus, since
transfer of the taxable estate of a decedent who is a citizen or resident of the Unit-
ed States. I.R.C. § 2001(a) (West 1992). The federal estate tax is considered an excise
tax because it is imposed upon the occurrence of a specified event-the transfer of
property upon death. RICHARD B. STEPHENS & THOMAS L. MARR, THE FEDERAL ESTATE
AND GIFT TAXES 1 (1959). An excise tax is distinct from a direct tax, which is levied
on a particular piece of property without regard to the occurrence of a specific
transaction. Id.
3. I.R.C. § 2001(a) (West 1992); see also DOUGLAS A. KAHN ET AL., FEDERAL TAXA-
TION OF ESTATES, GIFTS AND TRUSTS 1.102 (1970). If such a tax were imposed on
the recipient of the property it would be considered an inheritance tax as opposed to
an estate tax. Id.
4. Section 2051 of the Code provides that "the taxable estate shall be determined
by deducting from the value of the gross estate [applicable] deductions." I.R.C. § 2051
(West 1992). The tax liability can be determined by applying the rate schedule pro-
vided in subsection (c) of § 2001 of the Code. I.R.C. § 2001(c) (West 1992). The tax
rate is progressive, thus the larger the taxable estate the higher the tax rate. Id.; see
also STEPHENS & MARR, supra note 2, at 7.
5. Louis Eisenstein, The Rise and Decline of the Estate Tax, 11 TAX L. REV. 223,
224 (1956). The constitutionality of estate taxation was confirmed by the Supreme
Court in New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345 (1921).
6. See Larry W. Gibbs, Basic Federal Estate and Gift Taxation, 17 ST. MARY'S LJ.
809, 811 (1986). Gibbs states that the "[flear of the great fortunes and the perpetu-
ation of family dynasties was a striking feature of the late nineteenth century. This
fear gave rise to legislative action . . . [of taxing] away the large estates." Id.; see
also Eisenstein, supra note 5, at 224, 252-55 (discussing social objectives of estate
taxation).
7. The first death transfer tax was adopted in 1797 when the new nation faced a
possible military predicament due to its crumbling relations with France. Eisenstein,
supra note 5, at 225. In 1862, an inheritance tax was levied in order to raise reve-
nues for financing the Civil War. Id. at 225-26; see also Gibbs, supra note 6, at 810.
The present estate tax laws were enacted in 1916 to assist in the financing of the
First World War. Eisenstein, supra note 5, at 225-26; see also KAHN, supra note 3, at
3. For a detailed discussion on the fiscal objectives underlying estate tax laws, see
Eisenstein, supra note 5, at 238-52.
8. Jerome Kurtz & Stanley S. Surrey, Reform of Death and Gift Taxes: The 1969
fiscal objectives have scarcely been met by estate taxes, social policies
appear to be the dominant force motivating the taxation of estates.
Upon the enactment of the estate tax laws, many individuals com-
menced a search for avenues of circumventing the imposition of such
taxes. A traditional avoidance technique was to diminish one's gross
estate subject to taxation through inter vivos transfers.' In order to
obstruct such avoidance techniques, a federal tax was imposed on gifts
made during one's lifetime. The gift tax liability is calculated by mul-
tiplying the taxable gifts made during the calendar year by the applica-
ble rate."
Treasury Proposals, the Criticisms, and a Rebuttal, in ESTATE AND Girt TAXATION
163, 164 (Practising Law Inst., 1971). In 1969, the revenues raised from gift and es-
tate taxation were less than 2% of the total tax revenue raised. Id. In 1975, gift and
estate tax revenues were 1.7% of the total tax revenue raised. Gibbs, supra note 6,
at 811.
9. Jeffrey G. Sherman, 'Tis a Gift to be Simple: The Need for a New Definition
of 'Future Interests" for Gift Tax Purposes, 55 U. CIN. L. REv. 585, 589 (1987). The
estate tax is reduced by inter vivos transfers because "but for the transfer, [the
property] would have been subject to the estate tax at the donor's death." Id.
10. Section 2501 of the Internal Revenue Code provides in relevant part: "A
tax . . . is hereby imposed for each calendar year on the transfer of property by gift
during such calendar year by any individual, resident or non resident." I.R.C.
§ 2501(a)(1) (West 1992). The donor of the gift is primarily liable for payment of this
tax. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(a) (as amended in 1983). Although the Code states that a
gift tax is imposed on individuals, when the grantor of a gift is a corporation, the
gift tax may be imposed on the individual shareholders. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(h)(1)
(as amended in 1986). A gift has been defined as an "irrevocable transfer by a donor,
competent to make a gift, and clearly and unmistakably intending to divest himself of
title, dominion, and control over the subject matter of the gift, to a donee capable of
accepting a gift, or to someone acting as trustee or agent for the donee in accepting
it." JACOB RABKIN & MARK H. JOHNSON, FEDERAL INCOME Giv."r AND ESTATE TAXATION
§ 51.04[1l] (1992); see also Rev. Rul. 57-315, 1957-2 C.B. 624. Donative intent is not a
factor taken into consideration when determining whether a gratuitous transfer of
property has taken place for the purpose of gift tax laws. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-
1(g)(1) (as amended in 1983). Rather, a gift is made to the extent that "property is
transferred for less than an adequate and full consideration in money or money's
worth." I.R.C. § 2512 (West 1992). Under § 2511, a gift tax applies "whether the
transfer is in trust or otherwise, whether the gift is direct or indirect, and whether
the property is real or personal, tangible or intangible." I.R.C. § 2511(a) (West 1992).
11. Section 2503 of the Code provides that "taxable gifts [are] the total amount of
gifts made during the calendar year, less [applicable] deductions." I.R.C. § 2503(a)
(West 1992). The rates to be applied are the progressive tax rates provided in
§ 2001(c). I.R.C. § 2001(c) (West 1992). The method of computing the gift tax is set
forth in § 2502, which states that the tax rates are progressive, not just with respect
to the current year's gifts, but upon the cumulative amount of taxable gifts made by
the donor during his lifetime. I.R.C. § 2502 (West 1992); see also KAHN, supra note 3,
2.101, at 177.
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2. The Annual Exclusion
Currently, a taxpayer is permitted a $10,000 annual exclusion per
donee for gifts made after December 31, 1981.2 In the case of married
individuals, the annual exclusion increases to $20,000 per donee, pro-
vided that the donor's spouse consents to having made one-half of the
gift. 3 Furthermore, the number of donees for whom a taxpayer can
claim an annual exclusion is unlimited. 4 Thus, if a married taxpayer
was to make a gift of $25,000 to A and $25,000 to B, he would not have
a gift tax liability for the first $20,000 of gifts made to each donee, but a
gift tax would be imposed for the remaining $5,000.
a. The purpose of the annual exclusion
The purpose of the annual exclusion is "to obviate the necessity of
keeping an account of and reporting numerous small gifts, and yet to
12. Section 2503 of the Code provides: "In case of gifts (other than gifts of future
interests in property) made to any person by the donor during the calendar year, the
first $10,000 of such gifts to such persons shall not, for the purpose of subsection
(a), be included in the total amount of gifts made during such year." I.R.C. § 2503(a)
(West 1992). In the case of a transfer of property to a trust, a trust beneficiary is
considered a donee for the purpose of the annual exclusion. Helvering v. Hutchings,
312 U.S. 393, 396 (1941); see also Treas. Reg. § 25.2503-(2)(a) (as amended in 1984).
In the case of a transfer of property to a corporation, the shareholders of the corpo-
ration are considered to be the donees. See Chanin v. United States, 393 F.2d 972,
980 (9th Cir. 1968); Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(h)(1) (as amended in 1986); Rev. Rul. 71-
443, 1971-2 C.B. 337.
13. Section 2513 of the Code provides in relevant part:
A gift made by one spouse to any person other than his spouse shall, for the
purposes of this chapter, be considered as made one-half by him and one-
half by his spouse, but only if at the time of the gift each spouse is a citi-
zen or resident of the United States .... [This] paragraph . . . shall apply
only if both spouses have signified . . . their consent to the application of
[this] paragraph in the case of all such gifts made during the calendar year
by either while married to the other.
I.R.C. § 2513(a)(1)-(2) (West 1992). This process is known as "gift splitting." See
Treas. Reg. § 25.2513-1 (as amended in 1983). A gift tax return must be filed if a hus-
band and wife wish to split a gift. Id.
14. Section 2503(b) of the Code states that the first $10,000 of gifts to any person
is not a taxable gift. I.R.C. § 2503(b) (West 1992); see also Louis S. Harrison, The
Strategic Use of Lifetime Gifting Programs to Reduce Estate Taxes in Light of
Recent Congressional and Internal Revenue Service Antipathy Towards Transfer Tax
Reduction Devices, 40 DEPAUL L. REV. 365, 376 (1991) (stating that no limitations are
imposed on the number of donees eligible for the gift tax exclusion).
fix the amount sufficiently large to cover in most cases wedding and
Christmas gifts and occasional gifts of relatively small amounts."'5
Thus, based on the express language of the legislative history the exclu-
sion is intended to relieve taxpayers of the burden of accounting for
myriad immaterial gifts made during the course of the taxable year.
This language unequivocally repudiates the contention that donors can
uninhibitedly utilize the annual exclusion to shift their estate to mem-
bers of their family free of estate and gift tax.
The purpose of the annual exclusion can also be inferred from ac-
tions undertaken by Congress subsequent to its enactment. On several
occasions, Congress has taken affirmative steps to reduce the amount
of gift tax exclusion available.'6 Decreases in the amount of the exclu-
sion in 1939 and again in 1942 were prompted by Congress' recognition
that donors were exploiting the exclusion by transferring their estate to
members of their family free of estate and gift taxation.'7 Therefore,
based on the actions taken by Congress, it is clear that the annual ex-
clusion was not intended to be utilized as an estate tax avoidance de-
vice.
b. Limitations of the exclusion
The availability of the annual exclusion is not without limitations. In
order for the exclusion to be applicable, the transfer cannot be con-
strued as a transfer of a future interest."'
15. S. REP. NO. 708, 72d Cong., Ist Sess. 41 (1932).
16. Between 1932 and 1938, the amount of the annual exclusion was set at $5,000.
See S. REP. No. 665, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 41 (1932). In 1938, the amount of the
exclusion was decreased to $4,000. See H.R. REP. No. 1860, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 61
(1938) (recommending reduction to $3,000); H.R. REP. No. 2330, 75th Cong. 3d Sess.
17 (1938) (settling on reduction to $4,000). In 1942, the amount of the exclusion de-
creased to $3,000. See H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 37 (1942). In 1981
the exclusion was increased to $10,000. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 97TH
CONG., IST SESS., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE ECONOMIC RECOVERY TAX ACT OF 1981
273 (Comm. Print 1981) [hereinafter GENERAL EXPLANATION].
17. H.R. REP. No. 1860, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 61 (1938); H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th
Cong., 2d Sess. 37 (1942). The increase in the amount of the exclusion in 1981 was
made due to "the substantial increases in price levels" since the law was originally
enacted. GENERAL EXPLANATION, supra note 16, at 273.
18. Under § 2503 of the Code, the annual exclusion is available only for gifts
other than gifts of future interests. I.R.C. § 2503(b) (West 1992). A "future interest"
has been defined as a "legal term, and includes reversions, remainders, and other
interests or estates, whether vested or contingent, and whether or not supported by a
particular interest or estate, which are limited to commence in use, possession, or
enjoyment at some future date or time." Treas. Reg. § 25.2503-3(a) (as amended in
1983). In Fondren v. Commissioner, 324 U.S. 18, 20 (1945), the Supreme Court stated
that it is the postponement of enjoyment that makes an interest in property a future
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The Supreme Court initially addressed the issue of whether a particu-
lar type of transfer qualifies as a transfer of a present interest in United
States v. Pelzer.'9 In Pelzer, the taxpayer created a trust for the benefit
of his living and unborn grandchildren and provided for the accumula-
tion of income for a ten year period.' The Court stated that since
"[t]he 'use, possession, or enjoyment' of each donee is ... postponed to
the happening of a future uncertain event," the transfer constituted a trans-
fer of a future interest."' Thus, in determining whether a transfer quali-
fies for the annual exclusion, the fundamental issue to be addressed is
whether a transfer of a present interest has taken place.' The follow-
ing factual situation illustrates the distinction between present and
future interests. Assume A transfers property to B for life with remain-
der to C. B has the right to present enjoyment of property and thus has
received a present interest. On the other hand, C's use and enjoyment
of the property are to commence in the future; C has received a future
interest.
There are two apparent reasons for the imposition of such restric-
interest. See also Estate of Kolker v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 1082, 1085 (1983) (stating
that "the entire value of any gift of a future interest in property must be included for
the calendar quarter in which the gift is made"); Quatman v. Commissioner, 54 T.C.
339, 341 (1970) (stating that "the mere fact that the distribution of corpus is post-
poned is enough to make that gift a future interest"). The donor has the burden of
proving that the transfer does not constitute a future interest. Commissioner v.
Disston, 325 U.S. 442, 449 (1945); Herrmann's Estate v. Commissioner, 235 F.2d 440,
444 (5th Cir. 1956); Kniep v. Commissioner, 172 F.2d 755, 758 (8th Cir. 1949); Com-
missioner v. Sharp, 153 F.2d 163, 164 (9th Cir. 1946).
19. 312 U.S. 399 (1941); see also Ryerson v. United States, 312 U.S. 405, 408
(1941). The Ryerson court held that since the trustee's power to terminate the trust
was a contingency which might never occur, the gift was a future interest. Id.
20. Pelzer, 312 U.S. at 400.
21. Id. at 404.
22. A present interest has been defined as an "unrestricted right to the immediate
use, possession, or enjoyment of property or the income from property (such as a
life estate or term certain)." Treas. Reg. § 25.2503-3(b) (as amended in 1983). In
Fondren, the Court stated that a transfer of present interest has occurred where the
donee has a "right to substantial present economic benefit." 324 U.S. at 20; see also
Commissioner v. Disston, 325 U.S. 442, 447 (1945). However, if a beneficiary's "right
to receive the income payments is subject to the trustee's discretion, it is not a
present interest and no exclusion is allowable with respect to the transfer in trust."
Treas. Reg. § 25.2503-3(c)(1) (as amended in 1983); see also Hamilton v. United
States, 553 F.2d 1216, 1219 (9th Cir. 1977) (stating that, if based on the trust instru-
ment the trustee has excessive discretion in management and distribution of income,
the beneficiary has not received a present interest).
tions on the availability of the annual exclusion. First, restricting the
exclusion to transfers of a present interest is necessary to avoid diffi-
culties associated with determining the identity of donees and the value
of gifts made to such donees.' However, commentators have noted
that the restriction on the applicability of the exclusion is implicit in
the stated goals underlying the gift tax laws.' Second, as previously
stated, the exclusion was permitted to avoid the necessity of keeping
records of minor gifts exchanged between friends and family. While
gifts of present interests usually consist of minor gift exchanges, a gift
of a future interest is usually made with the intent to avoid taxes and
not with the intent to make a routine gift.2" Thus, limiting the exclu-
sion to conveyance of a present interest was another method by which
Congress sought to ensure that taxpayers did not use inter vivos trans-
fers as a tax avoidance device.
23. H.R. REP. No. 708, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1932); S. REP. No. 665, 72d Cong.,
1st Sess. 41 (1932). The identity of the donee and the value of the gift made to the
donee are necessary factors in determining whether the donor is entitled to a gift tax
exclusion. For instance, assume a taxpayer transfers $100,000 in trust naming A, B,
and C as beneficiaries. Also assume that the taxpayer gives the trustee the power to
distribute income to beneficiaries as he sees fit. Under § 2503(b), the donor gets a
$10,000 exclusion per donee. I.R.C. § 2503(b) (West 1992). Given the above factual
situation, it is not possible to determine the ultimate number of donees and the
ultimate value that each donee may receive. Since the exclusion is permitted on a
per-donee basis, it would not be possible to calculate the exclusion. See Sherman,
supra note 9, at 588; see also United States v. Pelzer, 312 U.S. 399, 403 (stating that
"[the exemption being available only in so far as the donees are ascertainable, the
denial of the exemption in the case of future interests is dictated by the apprehend-
ed difficulty, in many instances, of determining the number of eventual donees and
the values of their respective gifts").
24. Sherman, supra note 9, at 589. In many instances, an annual exclusion has
been unavailable on the basis that the transfer constituted a conveyance of a future
interest, even though the identity of the donees was ascertainable. Id.; see also Com-
missioner v. Glos, 123 F.2d 548, 549-50 (7th Cir. 1941) (holding that although the
identity of the ultimate beneficiary was not at issue, the gift constituted a gift of a
future interest because possession was postponed). Thus, the characteristics of the
gift must be taken into consideration in identifying the type of interest transferred.
Sherman, supra note 9, at 589.
25. Sherman, supra note 9, at 590.
One seldom makes a gift of a future interest without the advice and interven-
tion of an attorney or other professional. If a gift is in the form of future
interest, it is likely to have been made as much from tax-reduction motives
as from a simple desire to make the kind of gift that Congress sought to
exempt through section 2503(b). Accordingly, Congress chose, rather than
requiring an investigation into the motives prompting each gift of a future
interest, to disqualify such gifts altogether from the annual exclusion.
Id.
[Vol. 21: 83, 1993] Crummey Trusts
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
II. CRUMMEY TRUSTS: AN ABUSE OF THE ANNUAL EXCLUSION
Although Congress has attempted to prevent estate tax avoidance by
imposing gift taxes on inter vivos transfers and by placing restrictions
on the applicability of the gift tax exclusion, estate planners have devel-
oped new and more creative avoidance devices. A common estate plan-
ning strategy is the use of the annual exclusion to transfer significant
amounts of wealth while escaping estate and gift taxes.' Even though
the annual exclusion usually applies to outright transfers of property,n
many individuals wishing to utilize the exclusion are hesitant to surren-
der control of assets to their children.' Rather, these individuals prefer
to defer the beneficiaries' possession and enjoyment of the corpus and
income of gifts in trust.' Since the beneficiary does not have immedi-
ate access to the funds, the transfer is considered to be a conveyance
of a future interest, and thus does not qualify for the annual exclusion.'
26. Owen G. Fore et al., Probate Avoidance and Other Uses of Trusts, in ESTATE
PLANNING FOR THE FAMILY BUSINESS OWNER (ALI-ABA Course of Study, August 20,
1992), available in Westlaw, File No. C771 ALI-ABA 469, at *12 (stating that "[annual
exclusion gifts can be effective estate planning tool[s]"). This device also assists in
the avoidance of generation skipping tax. Under § 2642(c), inter vivos transfers that
qualify for the present interest gift tax exclusion under § 2503(b) are not subject to
generation skipping tax. I.R.C. § 2642(c) (West 1992).
27. Rev. Rul. 54-400, 1954-2 C.B. 319. "In the case of an outright and unrestricted
gift to a minor, the mere existence or nonexistence of a legal guardianship does not
of itself raise the question whether the gift is of a future interest." Id.; see also
STANLEY S. SURREY ET AL, FEDERAL WEALTH TRANSFER TAXATION 670 (2d ed. 1982).
There are many practical disadvantages associated with making an outright gift to a
minor. Frederick W. Whiteside, Giving Gifts to Minors Can Still Result in Signifi-
cant Income and Estate Tax Savings, 8 TAX'N FOR LAW. 282-83 (1980). When a minor
holds title to property, the court's permission must be obtained in order to dispose
of the property. Id. Additionally, upon a minor's death, the property reverts back to
the parents, thereby abrogating some of the tax benefits. Id.
28. Richard W. Harris & Steven W. Jacobson, Maximizing the Effectiveness of the
Annual Gift Exclusion, TAXES, Mar. 1992, at 205.
29. Id. According to the article, such taxpayers wish to transfer the property in or-
der to avoid the imposition of estate taxes, yet they wish to retain control over such
property. Id. A donor's desire to defer access to the trust's funds was typified in a
Private Letter Ruling where a parent delayed final distribution of the trust property
until the beneficiary reached age 60. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 82-29-097 (Apr. 22, 1982).
30. Gibbs, supra note 6, at 842; see also Burke A. Christensen, Defective Income
Tax Powers, Crummey Clauses and the IRS, 119 TR. & EST. 68-69 (1980). "A gift to
a trust does not usually convey a present interest in the gift to the trust beneficiary,
because the donee's enjoyment of the property is subject to the will of another per-
son-the trustee." Id.; see supra note 18 and accompanying text.
To avoid the unfavorable tax consequences of such transfers, practi-
tioners have developed an ingenious device that qualifies a transfer as a
present interest while permitting the deferral of distribution to the in-
tended beneficiary. The device employed by estate planners to avoid
the adverse tax consequences of an inter vivos transfer is known as a
Crummey Trust."
Even though the policies underlying the gift tax laws appear to be
quite clear, Crummey Trusts have been used for the purpose of avoid-
ing such taxes. These trusts have prevented the gift tax laws from pro-
viding a safeguard against estate tax avoidance as originally contemplat-
ed by enactment of the laws.
A. What Is a Crummey Trust?
To establish a Crummey Trust, the grantor contributes property to a
trust and grants the beneficiary a lapsing power to withdraw a specific
amount.' This power of withdrawal gives the beneficiary the power to
obtain "immediate use, possession or enjoyment of the property," thus
converting the transfer to that of a present interest qualifying for the
annual exclusion.' The power to compel distribution qualifies as a
31. This device is named after the case in which the technique was recognized:
Crummey v. Commissioner, 397 F.2d 82 (9th Cir. 1968). An alternative device that
can be used to transfer property to minors free of gift tax is a statutory trust for
minors provided for under § 2503(c) of the Code. Under this section a transfer of
property to a person under the age of twenty-one is considered a gift of a present
interest if the following requirements are satisfied: (1) the trust corpus and income
from the trust property may be consumed by the donee or for the benefit of the
donee before the age of twenty-one, (2) any amount not expended for the donee's
benefit shall pass to the donee at the age of twenty-one, and (3) if the donee passes
away prior to reaching the age of twenty-one, the remaining trust property must be
distributed to the donee's estate. I.R.C. § 2503(c) (West 1992). However, § 2503 trusts
are not as attractive as the Crummey Trust because they require the property to be
distributed to the beneficiary when he or she reaches the age of twenty-one. See
Demand Period of 30 Days Okayed for Crummey Trust, 53 J. TAX'N 34-35 (1980).
In order to better comprehend the operation of Crummey Trusts, the reader
must be familiar with fundamental trust terminology. A trust is defined as a "fiducia-
ry relationship in which one person is the holder of the title to property subject to
an equitable obligation to keep or use the property for the benefit of another."
GEORGE G. BOGERT & GEORGE T. BOGERT, LAW OF TRUSTS § 1, at 1 (5th ed. 1973). A
trustee is "the person who holds title for the benefit of another." Id. A settlor is "the
person who intentionally causes the trust to come into existence." Id. A beneficiary
is "the person for whose benefit the trust property is to be held or used by the
trustee." Id. at 2.
32. Thomas W. Abendroth, Grantor Trusts are Now Useful Planning Tools, 20
TAX'N FOR LAw. 81-84 (1991); see also Gibbs, supra note 6, at 842-43.
33. Gibbs, supra note 6, at 84243; see also Treas. Reg. § 25.2503-3(b) (as amended
in 1983).
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present interest if the beneficiary is not required to take any action
other than making the demand.' However, upon the creation of such a
trust, the donor must satisfy several additional requirements in order to
realize the benefit of the annual exclusion.
B. Requirements of Notice and Opportunity to Exercise
In order for the transfer to the Crummey Trust to qualify for the
annual exclusion, the withdrawal right must be accompanied with suffi-
cient notice of such right to the powerholder, as well as adequate time
for the right to be exercised.' The Internal Revenue Service (the Ser-
34. Rev. Rul. 75-415, 1975-2 C.B. 374. In this Revenue Ruling, the donee's right of
withdrawal was contingent upon him terminating his college education. The ruling
stated that a transfer of a present interest had not occurred if the donee's enjoyment
of the trust was subject to some contingency which is of "independent significance."
Id.; see also Kent Mason, An Analysis of Crummey and the Annual Exclusion, 65
MARQ. L. REV. 573, 577-78 (1982) (discussing the impact of prerequisites on the
donee's ability to exercise withdrawal power).
35. Mason, supra note 34, at 577-78. In Crummey, the Ninth Circuit did not im-
pose notice requirements as a prerequisite to the validity of such trusts. Crummey,
397 F.2d at 82. In fact, the court stated that it was unlikely that the powerholders
had any notice of transfers to the trust. Id. at 87. However, the Service has imposed
such restrictions in Revenue Ruling 81-7 which states:
A trust provision which gives a legally competent adult beneficiary the power
to demand corpus does not qualify a transfer to the trust as a present inter-
est eligible for gift tax annual exclusion under section 2503(b) of the Code, if
due to the donor's conduct, the beneficiary lacks knowledge of the power
and does not have a reasonable opportunity to exercise it before it lapses.
Rev. Rul. 81-7, 1981 C.B. 474.
The beneficiaries must generally receive actual notice of their withdrawal power.
Tech. Adv. Mem. 79-46-007 (July 26, 1979) (denying a taxpayer the benefit of the annu-
al exclusion because the grantor failed to take the imperative step of actually notifying
the beneficiary). This requirement applies to both minor and adult beneficiaries of such
trusts. Malcolm A. Moore, Tax Consequences and Uses of "Crummey" Withdrawal Pow-
ers: An Update, 1988 INST. ON EST. PLAN., 1102.1 (1988). If the beneficiary is a mi-
nor, notice should be given to the person's guardian or natural parents. Id.; see also
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 82-29-097 (Apr. 22, 1982); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 81-43-045 (July 29, 1981); Priv.
Ltr. Rul. 81-43-024 (July 28, 1981). Oral or written notice will be sufficient to satisfy
the notice requirement. Moore, supra, at 1102.2. However, for evidentiary reasons,
written notification is the preferred mode of informing beneficiaries of their power of
withdrawal. Id. If the trustee giving the notice is also the parent of the beneficiary, the
trustee's actual knowledge may render written notice unnecessary. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 80-08-
040 (Nov. 28, 1979); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-30-005 (July 27, 1990).
In cases involving multiple transfers during the year, a single annual notice letter
to each beneficiary containing the original contribution, the terms of the demand rights,
vice) has stated that the failure to comply with these requirements
makes the demand right "illusory," thus depriving the donor of the abili-
ty to utilize the annual exclusion.' In a number of private letter rul-
ings, the Service has held that the reasonable time requirement is satis-
fied if donees receive a minimum of thirty days in which to exercise
their demand power." However, in a recent tax court decision, a fif-
teen day withdrawal period was not contested by the Service.' Finally,
for evidentiary purposes, the beneficiary of the trust should recognize
the receipt of the notice in writing.' Once the donor satisfies the re-
quirements of notice and opportunity to exercise, the donor can avail
himself of the benefit of the annual exclusion if he assures the availabil-
ity of the proper assets in the trust.
C. Requirement of Availability of Liquid Assets
Generally, any type of property may be transferred to a trust, includ-
ing cash, bonds, stocks, life insurance policies, or real estate.' Howev-
and the amounts contributed satisfies the notice requirements. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 80-03-033
(Oct. 23, 1979); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 80-03-152 (Oct. 29, 1979); see also Richard S. Rotherberg,
Crummey Powers Enhance the Usefulness of Trusts for Minors and Life Insurance
Trusts, 15 EST. PLAN. 322-23 (1988) ("An initial notice can . . . satisfy the notice re-
quirement so long as the transfers conform to the description in the initial notice.")
36. Rev. Rul. 81-7, 1981 C.B. 474. Private Letter Ruling 79-46-007 sets forth an illus-
tration of an illusory demand right due to lack of notice. Priv. Ltr. Rul 79-46-007
(July 26, 1979). There, a donor created an irrevocable trust on December 29, 1976,
naming his grandson as beneficiary of the trust. Additionally, the trust instrument
stated that the beneficiary had the power to demand trust assets up to December 31,
1976. In considering the circumstances under which the gift was made, the Service
noted the donee's ignorance of his power to demand the trust corpus and the short
period of time in which he could exercise such power. The Service stated that the
donee had not received a present interest in the property because the donee's right
to immediate use of the property was dependent upon his knowledge of the right.
The ruling further stated that the donor's conduct was an indication of his intent to
transfer .a future interest in the property. Thus, the gift could not qualify for an
annual exclusion. Id.; see also Rev. Rul. 81-7, 1981 C.B. 474 (holding that the donee's
ignorance of the existence of his or her withdrawal powers "makes the demand right
illusory and effectively deprives the donee of the power," thereby preventing the
applicability of the annual exclusion).
37. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 80-03-152 (Oct. 29, 1979); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 80-24-084 (Mar. 21,
1980); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 80-04-172 (Nov. 5, 1979); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-30-005 (July 27, 1990).
38. Cristofani v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 74 (1991).
39. Rotherberg, supra note 35, at 323. (stating that written acknowledgement of
the receipt of the notice will protect the taxpayer in any future audit).
40. Whiteside, supra note 27, at 284 (stating that the types of property that can be
transferred in trust are "almost unlimited."); see also Rotherberg, supra note 35, at
325-27. Crummey powers are primarily utilized in connection with life insurance
trusts. Id. Such trusts hold life insurance policies during the life of the insured and
the proceeds are distributed to the beneficiaries of the policies upon death of the
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er, in establishing Crummey Trusts the applicability of the annual exclu-
sion is further conditioned upon the availability of sufficient liquid as-
sets." These assets include cash or assets convertible to cash which
may be used in the event that the beneficiary chooses to exercise his
withdrawal rights.' Assets that do not pose any problems include cash
and marketable securities.' Assets such as real estate and art works
are not clearly divisible and thus fail the nature of assets test unless the
trust instrument provides for a clear means of partition and withdraw-
al." The requirement of availability of liquid assets may also be satis-
fied by permitting a trustee's sale, encumbrance, loan, mortgage, or
other distribution in order to satisfy the exercise of the demand right."
If non-liquid assets are contributed to the trust, the demand right may
be considered illusory, rendering the transfer that of a future interest.4
insured. Id. The assets transferred to the trust consist of the cash necessary for the
premium payments. Id. Although these premium payments are considered to be a gift
to the beneficiary, granting the withdrawal rights to the beneficiary permits the
payments to go untaxed as present gifts. Id. Furthermore, settlors of such trusts can
transfer enormous portions of their wealth without incurring estate taxes, since the
value of life insurance proceeds is not included within their taxable estate. Id. How-
ever, for the transfer to be considered a present gift, the donee must be able to
withdraw the contract or a partial interest in the contract. Id.
41. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 81-18-051 (Feb. 9, 1981); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 81-03-074 (Oct. 23, 1980);
Tech. Adv. Mem. 84-45-004 (June 27, 1984); see also Moore, supra note 35, at
§ 1101.1. The withdrawal right may be exercised with reference to both newly trans-
ferred property and existing trust assets, in order to qualify for the annual exclusion.
Id.
42. Moore, supra note 35, at § 1101.1; see also Tech Adv. Mem. 84-45-004 (June
27, 1984); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 81-18-051 (Feb. 9, 1981); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 81-03-074 (Oct. 23,
1980).
43. Rotherberg, supra note 35, at 323.
44. Id.
45. Ernest Szarwark, Drafting Crummey Powers: The Current Rulings Scene, 5
NOTRE DAME EsT. PLAN. INsT. 483, 491 (1983) (stating that if. liquid funds are not
available, the beneficiary may be deprived of the power to withdraw unless the
trustee is empowered to sell or borrow against the trust assets); see also Priv. Ltr.
Rul. 78-26-050 (Mar. 29, 1978). In cases where life insurance policies are the assets of
the trust, the "nature of assets" test is satisfied if the trustee can satisfy a
beneficiary's exercise of his demand power by borrowing against the value of the
policies and conveying to the beneficiary either cash or an interest in the policies.
Id.; see also Priv. Ltr. Rul. 84-45-004 (June 27, 1984) (stating that asset availability is
ensured if the trust instrument gives the trustee power to sell or encumber the trust
property to satisfy the beneficiaries' demand).
46. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 81-18-051 (Feb. 9, 1981); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 81-03-074 (Oct. 23,
1980); Tech. Adv. Mem. 84-45-004 (June 27, 1984); see also Pamela H. Benya, How to
Qualify Gifts In Trust As Present Interests for the Gift Tax Exclusion, 7 EST. PLAN.
Once a donor drafts a trust instrument containing a power of with-
drawal, and once the requirements of notice, opportunity to exercise,
and availability of assets are satisfied, the donor may avail himself of
the benefits of the annual exclusion. However, courts have constantly
wrestled with the legitimacy of a trust established with the primary mo-
tive of avoiding estate and gift taxes.
D. Case History
As estate planners developed this innovative tax avoidance technique,
an important issue before the courts was whether such transfers in
trust constituted transfers of a present interest. This issue was of pri-
mary importance in cases involving minors as the beneficiaries of the
trust since they were not likely to exercise their withdrawal power.47
1. Supreme Court Precedent
On several occasions the United States Supreme Court has been
asked to determine whether a gift in trust qualifies for the annual exclu-
sion. In Fondren v. Commissioner,' the Supreme Court was called
upon to determine whether a transfer to a trust in conjunction with
granting withdrawal powers to the trustee constituted the transfer of a
present interest.4" The Court stated that the concept of present interest
does not refer solely to having a "vested interest;" rather the donee
must obtain a "substantial present economic benefit" evidenced by "the
right to presently use, possess, or enjoy the property."' The Fondren
Court further stated that in determining whether a transfer of a present
interest has occurred, one must consider the surrounding circumstances
194, 198 (1980) (stating that "it is possible that a trustee's ability to invest illiquid or
non-transferable assets could be viewed as creating a defeasible demand right in-
capable of valuation . . . and therefore [creating] a future interest.).
47. Crummey v. Commissioner, 397 F.2d 82, 88 (9th Cir. 1968). The Crummey
court stated that in cases involving minors as beneficiaries of the trust, it is extreme-
ly doubtful that a demand for funds will be made. Id.
48. 324 U.S. 18 (1945).
49. In Fondren, the trustors created a trust for the benefit of their seven grand-
children. Id. at 18. The trust provided that the trustee could distribute the corpus
and income of the trust to the beneficiaries during their minority upon a showing of
need on the part of the beneficiary. Id. at 22. The settlors claimed that an annual
exclusion was applicable for the transaction because the trustee's power to apply the
funds for the benefit of the children qualified the transaction as a transfer of a
present interest. Id. at 23-24. The Tax Court held that the transfer constituted a
transfer of a future interest. Id. at 19. The circuit court affirmed the Tax Court's
decision. Id. The Supreme Court affirmed.
50. Id. at 20; see also Ryerson v. United States, 312 U.S. 405 (1941); United States
v. Pelzer, 312 U.S. 399 (1941).
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as well as the specific terms of the trust."' The circumstances surround-
ing the trust in Fondren revealed that the parents of the minor benefi-
ciaries were quite capable of providing financial support for the benefi-
ciaries, and thus the contingency triggering the distribution of the
trust's funds was not likely to occur. 2 Because the surrounding cir-
cumstances demonstrated that such withdrawal was unlikely, the Court
held that the beneficiaries did not in essence have the right to use,
possess or enjoy the property, and thus did not receive a present inter-
est.'
The Supreme Court next addressed this issue in Commissioner v.
Disston,' where it reaffirmed Fondren.' The Fondren and Disston
Courts adopted a substance over form analysis to ascertain whether a
transfer would be characterized as a transfer of a present interest.
These decisions were consistent with the Court's long standing policy
favoring the substance of a transaction over its legal form.'
2. Circuit Court Decisions
Following the Fondren and Disston decisions, the circuit courts con-
tinued to hand down contradictory and irreconcilable holdings with
respect to the use of Crummey Trusts as a vehicle for tax avoidance."
This divergence of opinion was based on the controversy over whether
51. Fondren, 324 U.S. at 21-22.
52. Id. at 22.
53. Id. at 22-25.
54. 325 U.S. 442 (1945).
55. In Disston, the Court encountered a trust similar to the one created in
Fondren and reaffirmed its decision by holding that a consideration of the surround-
ing circumstances was essential to determination of the type of interest transferred.
Id. at 449. The Court stated that "[iln the absence of some indication from the face
of the trust or surrounding circumstances that a steady flow . . .of income to the
minor would be required, there is no basis for the conclusion that there is a gift of
anything other than for the future." Id.
56. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935). This case established the landmark
principle that the substance of a transaction, and not the form, determines the tax-
able consequences of that transaction. See id.; see also Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473
(1940); Deal v. Commissioner, 29 T.C. 730, 736 (1958) (stating that when "determining
whether the conveyance in question was a transfer by gift within the meaning of the
statute, it is the substance of the transaction which controls"); Rev. Rul. 77-299, 1977-
2 C.B. 343 (stating that the substance of the transaction determines whether the
transaction is a "bona fide sale" or a gift).
57. See, e.g., Kieckhefer v. Commissioner, 189 F.2d 118 (7th Cir. 1951); Stifel v.
Commissioner, 197 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1952).
extrinsic factors demonstrating the probability that a beneficiary would
receive the property should be considered when characterizing the
nature of the interest transferred.' In Kieckhefer v. Commissioner, the
Seventh Circuit stated that only the terms of the trust instrument were
relevant in determining whether the donor had transferred a present
interest to the donee.' The court further stated that if the sole impedi-
ment to the use of the trust assets is the minority of the beneficiary,
and not the terms of the instrument, the gift in trust must be deemed a
transfer of a present interest, thereby qualifying for the annual exclu-
sion.' Given the "simplicity and predictability" of the test adopted by
the Kieckhefer court,"' many circuits followed the same reasoning
when faced with similar issues.'
Other circuit courts reached results contradictory to Kieckhefer.' In
Stifel v. Commissioner, the Second Circuit stated that the circumstanc-
es surrounding the creation of a trust are relevant factors in determin-
ing the nature of the interest transferred.' The court stated that the
surrounding circumstances in that case demonstrated the impracticality
of the minor's ability to exercise the demand power and held that a trans-
fer of a present interest had not occurred.' The court further stated
that an analysis of the surrounding circumstances is essential in order
58. Szarwark, supra note 45, at 487.
59. Kieckhefer, 189 F.2d at 120-22. In Kieckhefer, the trustor created a trust naming
his infant grandson as the beneficiary. Id. at 119. The trust could be terminated at
the demand of the beneficiary or his guardian. Id. at 120. However, a guardian was
never appointed. Id.
60. Id. at 122.
61. Sherman, supra note 9, at 658 (discussing the objectivity of the test applied by
the Kieckhefer court and its virtues of "simplicity and predictability").
62. See, e.g., United States v. Baker, 236 F.2d 317 (4th Cir. 1956); Gilmore v.
Commissioner, 213 F.2d 520 (6th Cir. 1954). In Gilmore, the donor established trusts
for the benefit of her seven minor grandchildren. Id. at 520. The trust instrument
provided for payment of the trust corpus and income to the beneficiary upon the
beneficiaries' demand. Id. The court characterized the beneficiaries' interests as a.
present interest based on the "right given to the donee, in the trust instrument, to
use, possess, or enjoy" the trust property. Id. at 522 (citing Fondren v. Commissioner,
324 U.S. 18 (1945); United States v. Pelzer, 312 U.S. 399 (1941)).
63. See, e.g., Stifel v. Commissioner, 197 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1952); Perkins. v. Com-
missioner, 27 T.C. 601 (1956).
64. Stifel, 197 F.2d at 110. In that case, the beneficiary of the trust was a minor
who was given the right to terminate the trust at anytime by acting through her
guardian. Id. at 108.
65. Upon looking at the surrounding circumstances, the Stifel court discovered that
the minor beneficiary was incapable of demanding funds from the trust. Id. at 109-10.
The court also found that no guardian had been appointed to exercise the demand
power on behalf of the beneficiary. Id. Furthermore, the court implied that even if a
guardian had been appointed, the exclusion could have been denied if the guardian
was unlikely to exercise the demand power. Id.
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to avoid the donor's ability to "make gifts which on paper were 100%
present but in practice were 100% future."' The Stifel court followed a
substance over form approach and thus its holding was eonsistent with
the Fondren and Disston decisions, which were the controlling authori-
ty on this issue.
3. The Crummey Decision
The Ninth Circuit handed down the most significant decision dealing
with this issue in Crummey v. Commissioner.' In Crummey, the tax-
payers transferred property to an irrevocable trust, naming their two
minor children and two adult children as beneficiaries.' In order to
qualify for the annual exclusion, the taxpayers granted their children
the power to compel immediate distribution of the trust funds within a
specified period of time.' With respect to the minor beneficiaries, the
trust instrument provided that a guardian could make such demand on
their behalf.' The Commissioner of Internal Revenue challenged the
applicability of the annual exclusion to the transfers in trust for the
minor children, arguing that since the minors were not likely to exer-
cise their withdrawal powers, a transfer of a present interest had not
occurred." The court held that the power to demand distribution of
the trust funds and the legal capability of exercising that power are the
sole factors taken into consideration for the purpose of characterizing
the transfer as that of a present interest.2 The court further stated that
the likelihood of the beneficiary actually exercising withdrawal rights
was not relevant in determining the type of interest transferred, reason-
ing that such a test would be too arbitrary when conducted by the Ser-
vice.' Thus, the court found that the transfers to both the adult and
66. Id. at 110.
67. 397 F.2d 82 (9th Cir. 1968).
68. Id. at 82.
69. Id. at 83-84.
70. Id. at 84.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 88. In so holding, the Crummey court rejected both the Stifel and
Kieckhefer approaches and reached a middle ground. The Crummey court rejected
Stifel by stating that the applicability of the annual exclusion was not contingent
upon the appointment of a guardian. Id. The Crummey decision rejected the
Kieckhefer test by stating that there must be no impediment under the local law to
the appointment of a guardian. Id.
73. Id.
minor beneficiaries were excluded from gift tax under § 2503(b).74 The
Crummey decision was significant because the court gave donors judi-
cial approval of utilizing such trusts as a vehicle for estate and gift tax
avoidance.
E. An Analysis of the Crummey Decision
1. Disregard for Congressional Intent
Using the annual exclusion to transfer wealth free of estate and gift
tax is contrary to the Congressional intent in making such exclusion
available. As previously stated, the primary purpose behind the gift tax
laws was to prevent taxpayers from avoiding estate taxes by reducing
their gross estate through inter vivos transfers."5 An exclusion was al-
lowed in order to avoid the burden of tracking gifts exchanged between
family and friends.' However, Congress limited the applicability of the
exclusion to gifts of present interests because gifts of future interests
were more likely to be made for tax avoidance purposes.'
One weakness in the Crummey decision was its failure to recognize
the impact of its holding on the underlying policies of the gift tax laws.
First, most taxpayers' motives in the conveyance of property to such
trusts is the diminishment of their gross estate and the ensuing avoid-
ance of imposition of estate taxes.' Additionally, taxpayers can obtain
an exclusion from the payment of gift taxes by granting the beneficiary
a lapsing power to withdraw a certain sum within the specified peri-
od.' Such utilization of the annual exclusion is inconsistent with the
underlying reason that inspired Congress to create the exclusion-to
avoid keeping track of minor gifts.'° Furthermore, recognizing the
granting of Crummey power as a transfer of a present interest disre-
gards one of the primary grounds for distinguishing present and future
interests, that being the placement of an obstacle in the path of tax
avoidance." Since Crummey Trusts are used primarily as a device by
74. Id.
75. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
76. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
77. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
78. Harris & Jacobson, supra note 28, at 204.
79. Crummey v. Commissioner, 397 F.2d 82, 88 (9th Cir. 1968).
80. Nicholas A. Vlietstra, Estate of Cristofani v. Commissioner: The Expanded
Potential of Crummey Powers for Transfer Tax Avoidance, 45 TAX LAw. 583, 595
(1992). "[Aln exclusion was included in the gift tax laws for the express purpose of
relieving gift givers of the burden of keeping an accounting of and reporting small
gifts made in the course of the 'year." Id.
81. Id. Congress denied application of the exclusion to transfers of future interests
because such transfers were more likely to be made for tax avoidance purposes. Id.
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which one can accomplish a tax free transfer of property, the use of
such trusts is inconsistent with the policies underlying the creation of
estate and gift tax laws.
2. Failure to Follow Precedent
In addition to undermining the purpose behind the estate and gift tax
laws, the Crummey decision runs contrary to the weight of controlling
case law. The Fondren and Disston decisions represent the Supreme
Court's refusal to consider the terms of the trust in isolation from reali-
ty; rather, the Court required that the surrounding circumstances be
considered when determining whether the transfer constituted a trans-
fer of a present interest.' The Crummey court, in holding that the
granting of "Crummey powers" is sufficient to create a transfer of a
present interest, reasoned that it is not necessary to consider the likeli-
hood that the power would be exercised. Rather, it is sufficient that the
beneficiary of the trust simply possess the power to exercise the with-
drawal rights.' The Crummey device is based upon the legal fiction
that granting a withdrawal right creates a transfer of a present inter-
estO Many commentators have recognized that the Crummey demand
power is a sham in most instances' because the nature of the transac-
82. Fondren v. Commissioner, 324 U.S. 18, 24 (1945); Disston v. Commissioner,
325 U.S. 442, 449 (1945). It is possible to justify the Crummey holding in light of the
Fondren and Disston decisions by drawing a factual distinction between the two
cases. See John L. 'Peschel, Annual Gift Tax Exclusion: Refining the Crummey
Power, 33 S. CAL. TAX INST. 1401 (1981). Peschel notes that in situations such as
Fondren and Disston, where the trustee was empowered to exercise discretion in the
distribution of trust assets to single or multiple beneficiaries, the annual exclusion
has been disallowed. Id. Unlike Fondren and Disston, in which the withdrawal power
was granted to the trustee, in Crummey the withdrawal power was granted directly
to the donee. Therefore, the determination of whether the transfer is a present inter-
est hinged on the identity of the power-holder. Other commentators have not accept-
ed this distinction, arguing that an analysis of the surrounding circumstances is
required in determining Whether a transfer of a present interest has taken place, re-
gardless of the identity of the powerholder. See Vlietstra, supra note 80, at 590.
Vlietstra states that given the Fondren and Disston decisions, it is difficult to under-
stand the court's insistence on avoiding the significance of the surrounding circum-
stances. Id.
83. Crummey, 397 F.2d 82, 87-88.
84. Benya, supra note 46, at 199 ("[Plowers of withdrawal . . . facilitate creation
of present interests in name only, while, in reality creating future interest.").
85. See, e.g., Benjamin N. Henszey, Crummey Power Revisited, 59 TAXES 76-77
(1981).
tion typically indicates that the power will not be exercised due to the
minor's practical inability to exercise such rights.' It is apparent that
the Crummey court adopted a form over substance approach in deter-
mining whether a present interest had been transferred. 7 Since, the
Fondren court required a substance over form analysis, the Crummey
holding is contrary to controlling precedent.
F. The Service's Position on the Issue
Even though the Crummey decision displays disregard for the signifi-
cance of precedent and legislative intent, the Service has recognized the
holding as a valid decision.' The Service has recognized the applica-
tion of the annual exclusion to transfers of property in trust for a minor
if the minor has the right to demand the trust funds, even in the ab-
sence of a legally appointed guardian, provided that there would be no
barrier to the appointment of such guardian.' Although such a ruling
by the Service is not binding precedent on the courts, if the courts are
faced with this issue in the near future,' they may utilize the Service's
rulings to illustrate that the receipt of the Crunmey power of withdraw-
86. Joseph M. Dodge, Redoing the Estate and Gift Taxes Along Easy-to Value
Lines, 43 TAx L. REV. 241, 344. Dodge stated that the "rationale [behind Crummey]
defies common sense because even if the minor is informed of her rights it is ex-
tremely unlikely that the minor would be willing or practically able to exercise the
rights." Id. Dodge further stated that "an unexercised inter vivos general power of
appointment [should] not be treated as the equivalent of ownership for federal trans-
fer tax purposes." Id. at 345.
87. Lloyd. L. Plaine, How to Take Full Advantage of the Increased Exclusion for
Gifts of Present Interests, 27 TAX'N FOR ACcT. 366 (1981) (stating that the application
of the present interest doctrine "elevates form over substance" by characterizing some
interests as present interests even though such characterization is not proper).
88. The Service accepted the Crummey outcome in 1973. Rev. Rul. 73-405, 1973-2
C.B. 321, revg Rev. Rul. 54-91,, 1954-1 C.B. 207; see also Priv. Ltr. Rul. 80-04-172
(Nov. 5, 1979); Tech. Adv. Mem. 79-02-007 (Sept. 26, 1978); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 78-26-050
(Mar. 29, 1978).
89. Rev. Rul. 73-405, 1973-2 C.B. 321. The ruling was based on Crummey v. Com-
missioner, 397 F.2d 82 (9th Cir. 1968); Gilmore v. Commissioner, 213 F.2d 520 (6th
Cir. 1954); United States v. Baker, 236 F.2d 317 (4th Cir. 1956); and Kieckhefer v.
Commissioner, 189 F.2d 118 (7th Cir. 1951). The ruling stated that:
[lit is now concluded that a gift in trust for the benefit of a minor should
not be classified as a future interest merely because no guardian was in fact
appointed. Accordingly, if there is no impediment under the trust or local law
to the appointment of a guardian and the minor donee has a right to de-
mand distribution, the transfer is a gift of a present interest that qualifies for
the annual exclusion allowable under § 2503(b) of the code.
Rev. Rul. 73405, 1973-2 C.B. 321.
90. Stark v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 243, 250-51 (1986); Neuhoff v. Commissioner, 75
T.C. 36, 46 (1980), offd, 669 F.2d 291 (5th Cir. 1982).
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al is equivalent to the receipt of a present interest.'
The Service's acknowledgment that the grant of a Crummey power to
a trust beneficiary created a transfer of a present interest was based
upon previous court decisions which recognized that the right to obtain
property upon demand was tantamount to the actual ownership of the
property.' The Service extended the application of this rule to minors
in Revenue Ruling 54400, stating that the legal disability of minors does
not prevent the exclusion from applying to gifts made to such mi-
nors
.3
Although the Service has acquiesced in the Crummey decision, the
Service's requirements of notice and the opportunity to exercise makes
the validity of such trusts more restrictive than that set out by the
Crummey court.' As a basis for this requirement, the ruling stated
that the donor's intent is a significant factor in determining whether the
circumstances demonstrate that a transfer of a present interest has
taken place. 5 Lack of adequate notice and opportunity to exercise
one's demand power is an indication of the donor's intent to deprive
the donee of the right to present enjoyment of the trust property.' Al-
though the Service has approved of the Crummey decision, it continues
to deprive donors of the benefit of the annual exclusion if the circum-
stances reveal that such power was not intended to be exercised. Given
91. Tele-Communications, Inc. v. Commissioner, 95 T.C. 495, 510 (1990) (stating
that although Private Letter Rulings are not an authoritative force of law, the court
can consider them in reaching the outcome of the case); see also Cristofani v. Com-
missioner, 97 T.C. 74, 81 (1991) (stating that a previous ruling was a strong impetus
in the court's determination that a lapsing power to demand possession of trust
assets constitutes a present interest).
92. Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U.S. 280, 283-84 (1933); Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S.
376, 378 (1930). The Corliss court stated that "if a man disposes of a fund in such a
way that another is allowed to enjoy the income" then "[tihe income that is subject
to a man's unfettered command and that he is free to enjoy at his own opinion may
be taxed to him as his income, whether he sees fit to enjoy it or not." Id.
93. Rev. Rul. 54-400, 1954-2 C.B. 319. "An unqualified and unrestricted gift to a mi-
nor, with or without the appointment of a legal guardian, is a gift of a present in-
terest; and disabilities placed upon minors by State statutes should not be considered
decisive in determining whether such donees have the immediate enjoyment of the
property or the income therefrom." Id.
94. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
95. Rev. Rul. 81-7, 1981-1 C.B. 474. "[Tjhe donor's intent, as gleaned from the
circumstances of the transfer, is a relevant consideration in determining when the
rights actually conferred are meant to be enjoyed." Id.
96. Id.
the Service's reluctance to entirely sanction Crummey Trusts, the
boundaries of the usefulness of such trusts remain an open ended ques-
tion.
III. TESTING THE BOUNDARIES OF CRUMMEY
The scope of the utility of Crummey Trusts remains ambiguous."
The effectiveness of a Crummey Trust as a mechanism for estate and
gift tax avoidance is greatly dependent upon the identity of the individ-
uals who qualify as the beneficiaries of such trusts. Generally, the great-
er the number of potential beneficiaries, the greater the amount of
wealth that may be transferred devoid of estate and gift taxation." The
class of eligible beneficiaries can substantially increase if there is no
requirement that the beneficiaries of such trusts have a beneficial inter-
est in the trust separate from their withdrawal powers. A recent tax
court decision and Revenue Ruling indicate controversy as to whether
the holders of Crummey powers must have a beneficial interest in the
trust. 0
A. The Cristofani Decision
In the recent decision of Estate of Cristofani v. Commissioner, the
Tax Court further expanded the effectiveness of Crummey Trusts as a
mechanism for estate and gift tax avoidance.0 ' The trustor in
Cristofani granted Crummey powers to her two children, who were the
primary beneficiaries of the trust, and her five grandchildren, who were
contingent beneficiaries.'0 ' The Tax Court, following the Crummey
97. Mason, supra note 34, at 574. Mason states that "It]here has been little law
defining the scope of the demand right rule articulated in Crummey. Thus, many
questions remain unanswered or inadequately addressed." Id.
98. Matthew V. Ressegieu, Utility of Crummey Trusts Expanded by New Decision,
20 TAX'N FOR LAw. 136 (1991).
99. Cristofani v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 74 (1991); see infra notes 100-03 and
accompanying text; see also Tech. Adv. Mem. 87-27-003 (Mar. 16, 1987); Tech. Adv.
Mem. 90-45-002 (July 27, 1990); infra notes 108-10 and accompanying text.
100. 97 T.C. 74 (1991); see also Ressegieu, supra note 98, at 136-37 (discussing the
impact of the Cristofani decision on transfer tax avoidance).
101. Cristofani, 97 T.C. at 75-76. The trust assets were to go to the trustee's chil-
dren upon her death, but in the event that either child did not survive her by 120
days, that child's shares would be distributed to the child's issue. Id. at 76. The
interests of the grandchildren were, therefore, contingent remainders. "A contingent
remainder . . . is an interest which, in addition to being dependent upon the termina-
tion of the prior estate, depends upon the resolution of some other contingency
before the owner of the interest is entitled to take in possession." JOHN T. GAUBAT7
& IRA M. BLOOM, ESTATES, TRUSTS, AND TAXES: CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE WEALTH
TRANSMISSION PROCESS, § 10-7 (1983). A vested interest is "one in which the right of
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reasoning, held that the contingent beneficiaries' legal ability to exer-
cise their withdrawal rights was sufficient to create a transfer of a pres-
ent interest, thereby invoking the application of the annual exclu-
sion."4 Thus, the donor was permitted to claim seven gift tax exclu-
sions of $10,000 each for two successive years."4
B. Consequences of Holding Contingent Beneficiaries
as the Legitimate Donees of a Crummey Trust
The Cristofani decision has transformed the Crummey Trust into a
much more powerful and useful device for transfer tax avoidance than
it was when first judicially approved. The decision extended the class
of eligible beneficiaries to include those possessing a mere contingent
remainder in a trust by holding that such beneficiaries holding
Crummey powers have received a present interest."4 Based on this
decision, a donor can easily multiply the number of annual exclusions
available to him through the conveyance of contingent interests which
have a slight likelihood of vesting, thereby transferring substantial
amounts of wealth devoid of estate and gift taxation. 5 Following
Cristofani, the number of exclusions one can obtain is merely restrict-
ed by the number of people who will most probably not exercise their
demand rights." Furthermore, if the Cristofani decision is permitted
to stand, the same rationale may apply to cases involving withdrawal
rights not coupled with any type of interest in the trust, that is, a "na-
ked withdrawal right"." 7 Thus, permitting holders of Crummey powers
the owner of the interest ...to take possession is absolutely determined." Id.
102. Cristofani, 97 T.C. 74, 79-82; see also Crummey v. Commissioner, 397 F.2d. 82,
88 (9th Cir. 1968).
103. Cristofani, 97 T.C. at 84-85.
104. Id. at 82.
105. Vlietstra, supra note 80, at 585. Even though a donor takes a risk that a
powerholder may exercise withdrawal rights, the donor can easily minimize such
risks by cautiously selecting persons to whom such rights will be granted. Id. at 585
n.15.
106. Mason, supra note 34, at 593 ("[Olne can, without altering the intended dis-
position in a real way, obtain as many exclusions as one can find people who will
not exercise their demand right.").
107. James C. Cavanaugh & Robert J. Preston, When Will Crummey Transfers to
Contingent Beneficiaries be Excludable Present Interests?, 76 J. TAX'N 68-69 (1992);
Fiore, supra note 26, at 13; John E. Ramsbacher, Crummey Powers for Contingent
Beneficiaries Ok'd, 19 EST. PLAN. (1992) ("Cristofani does not stand for the premise
that naked powers qualify for present interest annual exclusions, although logic
without a beneficial interest in the trust to qualify as eligible benefi-
ciaries allows taxpayers to avoid estate and gift taxation through the
fabrication of annual exclusions.
C. The Service's Position
Attempts by taxpayers to multiply the number of annual exclusions
have consistently been rejected by the courts and the Service.'" When
a donor confers withdrawal powers to a beneficiary who does not hold
a sufficient interest in the trust, there is a manifestation that the
donor's sole motive is to multiply the number of annual exclusions,
thereby compelling the Service to reject the applicability of the exclu-
sion under those circumstances.'" These rulings apply in cases where
the beneficiaries of the trust have no beneficial interest in the trust
assets or hold only a contingent remainder in the trust."' Given the
dictates that this should be permitted.").
108. The Service has ruled that the creation of reciprocal withdrawal powers by
multiple grantors does not effectively create multiple annual exclusions. Rev. Rul. 85-
24, 1985-1 C.B. 329. In this Revenue Ruling, two brothers created trusts for the bene-
fit of their children and each brother granted to his nephew a withdrawal power not
coupled with any interest in the trust property. The Service disallowed exclusions for
the nephews who held naked withdrawal powers. Id.; see also United States v. Estate
of Grace, 395 U.S. 316 (1969) (discussing reciprocal withdrawal powers).
Similar attempts to avoid taxation have been nullified by the courts. In Heyen v.
United States, 945 F.2d 359 (10th Cir. 1991), a donor issued stock to 29 persons, 27
of whom immediately reissued the stock to members of the donor's family. The
Tenth Circuit held that this was an unsuccessful attempt by the donor to multiply the
number of annual exclusions available to him, and thus amounted to tax fraud. Id. at
365.
109. See Tech. Adv. Mem. 87-27-003 (Mar. 16, 1987); Tech. Adv. Mem. 90-45-002
(July 27, 1990). Both Memoranda hold that the gift tax exclusion only applies to
transfers wherein the powerholders are primary beneficiaries with a sufficient interest
in the trust property. See also Moore, supra note 35, at 1101.1. Moore discusses
the types of interests which may qualify as sufficient beneficial interest. For example,
a beneficiary entitled to distribution of income or principal on a discretionary basis is
considered to have a sufficient beneficial interest. A beneficiary who will be entitled
to the future interest in the trust corpus is also considered to have a sufficient
beneficial interest. Finally, a beneficiary who would be entitled to take a share of the
trust property only upon the death of the primary beneficiaries of the trust will
probably not have a sufficient beneficial interest Id.; see also Lynn K. Pearle,
Crummey Withdrawal Powers-Recent Developments, 13 EST., GiFrs, & TR. J. 49, 50-
51 (1988) (discussing the requirement of sufficient beneficial interest and the impact
of Tech. Adv. Mem. 87-27-003).
110. Tech. Adv. Mem. 9141-008 (June 24, 1991); Tech. Adv. Mem. 90-45-002 (July 27,
1990); Tech. Adv. Mem. 87-27-003 (Mar. 16, 1987). In the 1987 Technical Advice
Memorandum, the trustor granted Crummey withdrawal rights to individuals having no
beneficial interest in the trust and claimed 16 annual exclusions. A number of benefi-
ciaries attempted to exercise their withdrawal power, but upon a discussion with the
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controversial nature of the Crummey device and the Service's strong
opposition to the expansion of such trusts, it is probable that the Ser-
vice will request legislative action limiting the utility of Crummey Trusts
in order to terminate such blatant abuse of the annual exclusion."'
D. Arguments Opposing Proliferation of the Annual Exclusion
Through the Expansion of Eligible Beneficiaries
1. The Expansion is Not Supported by Case Law
As a basis for its holding, the Cristofani court placed considerable
reliance on the reasoning set forth by the Crummey court."' Given
the significant factual distinctions between the two cases, the court's re-
liance on Crummey cannot be justified."3 While the beneficiaries in
Crummey possessed a "substantial future economic benefit," the in-
terest of the contingent beneficiaries in Cristofani was not vested and
there was a high probability that it would never vest."4 The Gristofani
court rejected this "probability" principle by stating that the vesting
probability is irrelevant. Rather, the court held that the only relevant
factor to consider in determining whether there has been a transfer of a
present interest is the beneficiary's legal right to exercise the demand
power."5 Given the significant distinctions between the two cases, the
Cristofani court should have conducted a thorough analysis of the
surrounding circumstances prior to concluding that the contingent ben-
eficiaries had received a present interest in the trust. The court's failure
to recognize this vital distinction between Crummey and its own case
has the effect of transforming Crummey Trusts into a much more pow-
erful tax avoidance tool than originally contemplated by the Crummey
trustee, retracted their request. The Service rejected the eligibility of the beneficiaries
due to lack of sufficient beneficial interest. Id. In AOD 1992-09 (Apr. 6, 1992), the
Service acquiesced in the Cristofani result because, if it chose to appeal, it would
have to do so in the Ninth Circuit where Crummey was originally decided. Id.
111. Contingent Remaindermen Get Crummey Demand Rights Too, 17 TR. MGMT.
EST. & GIFr TAx'N J. 91 (1992).
112. Cristofani v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 74, 79-82 (1991); Crummey v. Commission-
er, 397 F.2d 82 (9th Cir. 1968).
113. Vlietstra, supra note 80, at 591 ("[T]he difference between the interests of the
beneficiaries in Crummey and those in Cristofani is significant enough that the court
should have adopted a more comprehensive test in determining whether the grand-
children had received gifts of other than a future interest.").
114. This argument was raised by the Service in Cristofani, 97 T.C. at 82.
115. Id.
court.
The Cristonfani court also cited Perkins v. Commissioner" as sup-
porting authority for its holding."7 However, Perkins does not support
the position of the Cristofani court. While the Perkins court specifi-
cally stated that "the circumstances surrounding the creation of the
trusts and the making of the gifts are relevant factors to be considered
along with the trust instruments themselves,""' the Cristofani court
insisted that such extrinsic factors were not pertinent. "' Thus, there is
a lack of support for the Cristofani court's determination that the cir-
cumstances surrounding the creation of such trusts are not relevant
considerations in analyzing the nature of the interest transferred.
Although there is a lack of guidance with respect to determining the
identity of those qualifying as legitimate donees of a Crummey Trust,
the one case that touched upon this issue was completely disregarded
by the Cristofani court.'2" In Jacobson v. United States, the donees
had the power to transfer their interests in the trust to their children,
thus allowing the children to have immediate access to the assets of the
trust. '2 The Jacobson court held that the taxpayer could not avail him-
self of the annual exclusion, reasoning that the exclusion is restricted
to cases where the persons benefiting from the exercise of the demand
power are also principal beneficiaries of the trust." The court found
that the children of the grantor, not the grandchildren, were the benefi-
ciaries of the trust." Although Jacobson does not have precedential
value for the tax court, commentators have noted that the case was
116. 27 T.C. 601 (1956).
117. Cristofani, 97 T.C. at 80.
118. Perkins v. Commissioner, 27 T.C. at 605. The Perkins court stressed the signifi-
cance of the circumstances surrounding the gift in determining whether it constituted
a transfer of a present or future interest. Id. at 605. The court considered several
factors extrinsic to the trust instrument, including the trustee's failure to distribute
any assets to the beneficiary, the beneficiary's failure to exercise his right to with-
draw, the impracticality of the minor's ability to demand funds, the ability of the
beneficiary's parents to provide financial support, and the failure to appoint a guard-
ian to exercise such rights on behalf of the minor beneficiary. Id. at 604. However,
the Perkins court characterized the transaction as a transfer of a present interest
because the beneficiary's parents had the right to demand the trust funds, and such
demand could not be legally resisted. Id. at 605.
119. Cristofani, 97 T.C. at 81.
120. Jacobson v. United States, 78-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 13,256 (D. Neb. 1978).
121. Id. The taxpayer in Jacobson contended that such power vested in the donee
was similar to Crummey power and thus entitled him to an annual exclusion. Id.
122. Id.; see also Mason, supra note 34, at 590-92. Mason points out that the diffi-
culties associated with drawing distinctions between principal and secondary benefi-
ciaries results from the court's failure to provide guidelines as to how this distinction
must be made. Id. at 591.
123. Jacobson, 78-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 13,256.
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entitled to be mentioned by the Cristofani court, especially given the
fact that its application could have altered the outcome of the
Cristofani decision.'24
The lack of support from applicable case law and the court's disre-
gard for cases that could have altered its holding leave the Cristofani
decision vulnerable to attack.
2. Relevance of the Donor's Intention
An alternative argument raised by the Service in Cristofani was that
the creation of a contingent interest in a trust is an indication of the
donor's intention not to confer actual benefits on those holding such an
interest.'" Rather, the donor displayed an intention to procure tax
benefits by multiplying the number of annual exclusions available to
him.2 Such contentions have been rejected on the grounds that a
donor's tax saving motive is irrelevant in ascertaining the tax conse-
quences of a transaction.'27 However, given the excessive abuse of the
annual exclusion for transfer tax avoidance, a greater scrutiny of the
donor's intentions is justified.
Additionally, in order to give effect to the substance of a transaction,
as opposed to its legal form, the courts have considered the donor's
intent relevant under certain circumstances."~ In Deal v. Commis-
sioner, the taxpayer transferred property to her children and received a
series of demand notes in exchange for the purchase price." The tax-
payer nullified the notes one by one in an amount equal to the annual
gift tax exclusion."n The Tax Court concluded that the donor was not
entitled to the annual exclusion because there was never an intention
124. Vlietstra, supra note 80, at 593. Vlietstra notes the factual distinctions between
Jacobson and Cristofani, yet he concludes that since Jacobson was the only case
that had considered secondary beneficiaries as eligible donees, the case deserved to
be mentioned. Id.
125. Cristofani, 97 T.C. at 84.
126. Id.
127. Cristofani, 97 T.C. at 84; Perkins v. Commissioner, 27 T.C. 601 (1956). The
Perkins court stated that "regardless of the petitioners' motives, or why they did
what they in fact did, the legal rights in question were created by the trust instru-
ments and could at any time thereafter be exercised. Petitioners having done what
they purported to do, their tax-saving motive is irrelevant" Id. at 606.
128. Deal v. Commissioner, 29 T.C. 730 (1958).
129. Id. at 731-32.
130. Id. at 732-34.
to enforce the notes. 3 ' The entire value of the transaction was consid-
ered to be a taxable gift in the year of the alleged sale. 2 Based on the
Deal rationale, the donor's intent should be a relevant consideration in
assuring that the substance of a transaction prevails over its legal form.
3. Implied Illusory Demand Right
The Service's refusal to extend Crummey benefits to contingent ben-
eficiaries is an illustration of its determination to ensure that the sub-
stance of a transaction takes precedence over its legal form."3 A con-
tingent beneficiary's failure to exercise his demand power evidences the
existence of a collusive agreement between the donor and the benefi-
ciary that the right will not be exercised, thereby rendering the right
illusory. "4 Given the fact that the beneficiary's interest may never vest,
it is not logical to assume that the beneficiary has simply chosen not to
exercise this lapsing right. 135 In light of the excessive abuse of the
Crummey power, the existence of a collusive agreement should be pre-
sumed, thus shifting the burden of proving the non-existence of such
understanding to the taxpayer."n However, the Cristofani court held
that the existence of such an agreement will not be implied in the ab-
sence of direct evidence of such fact.'37 The Tax Court's decision in
131. Id. at 734.
132. Id. at 736-37.
133. Cavanaugh & Preston, supra note 107, at 70.
134. Id. In a relevant ruling, the Service stated that the annual exclusion does not
apply to cases where the beneficiaries' rights are illusory. Rev. Rul. 81-7, 1981 C.B.
474; see also Tech. Adv. Mem. 90-45-002 (July 27, 1990); Tech. Adv. Mem. 9141-008
(July 24, 1991) (developing the collusive agreement argument). In Technical Advice
Memorandum 91-41-008, the trustor established a trust naming her three children as
primary beneficiaries and her 32 grandchildren as contingent beneficiaries, and there-
by attempted to transfer $350,000 free of gift taxes. Id. The Service disallowed the
exclusipn, reasoning that logic implicated an implied understanding that the benefi-
ciary would not exercise such rights. Id.
135. Cavanaugh & Preston, supra note 107, at 70 (stating that a contingent
beneficiary's failure to exercise his withdrawal demonstrates the existence of an
agreement to refrain from exercising such power). See also Jeffrey N. Pennell, Recent
Wealth Transfer Tax Developments, in SOPHISTICATED ESTATE PLANNING TECHNIQUES
(AUI-ABA Course of Study, Sept. 17, 1992), available in Westlaw, File No. C766 ALI-
ABA 253.
136. But see Mason, supra note 34, at 596. Mason provides two reasons as to why
the burden of proof should not be judicially or statutory modified. First, it is likely
that the Service will refrain from challenging demand rights based on existence of
such agreements. Second, the Crummey demand right has been firmly established
within the legal system and many have relied on it. Id.
137. See Cristofani v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 74, 77 (1991); see also Linderme v.
Commissioner, 52 T.C. 305, 307 (1969) (stating that the government must present
"adequate grounds for inferring an agreement" in order for the existence of an agree-
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Cristofani allows an inference that the existence of a legal fiction pre-
vails over the substance of the transaction.' Since the Supreme Court
has held that the legal form of the transaction must yield to its sub-
stance, this decision is contrary to the weight of controlling prece-
dent. 39
IV. SUGGESTED REMEDIES FOR THE CRUMMEY/CRISTOFANI PROBLEMS
Since Crummey Trusts have undermined the policy underlying the gift
tax statutes and have failed to follow precedent, judicial or legislative
action is necessary to limit their use as a tax avoidance device and to
further the policy goals behind the statutes. This Comment discusses
possible solutions available to the legislature or the judiciary should
they encounter this issue in the near future.
A. Elimination of Crummey Trusts
One alternative available to the legislature or the judiciary is absolute
elimination of the Crummey Trust.4 ' Various commentators support
this view based on the argument that a donor who wants to give anoth-
er the alternative to accept a gift may do so informally, without the aggra-
vation of creating a formal trust.' This contention implies that trans-
fers to a trust in conjunction with the granting of Crummey Powers is
primarily a tax avoidance maneuver.
Some commentators have noted that the validity of Crummey Trusts
cannot be questioned given the current definition of present and future
interests.' These scholars argue that a gift should qualify as a trans-
fer of a present interest if at the moment of the transfer, the donee has
ment to be implied).
138. Cavanaugh & Preston, supra note 107, at 70.
139. See Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469-70 (1935); see also Deal v. Commis-
sioner, 29 T.C. 730, 736 (1958).
140. Pennell, supra note 135, at § 13.1.
141. Vlietstra, supra note 80, at 594; see also Boris I. Bittker, The $10,000 Per-
Donee Gift Tax Exclusion, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 447, 463 (1983) ("[I]n Crummey the
beneficiaries, whether adults or minors, were obviously not expected to exercise their
rights under the demand clause, if that had been contemplated, the donor would un-
doubtedly have made outright gifts to the beneficiaries rather than have put the
funds into the trust and watch them flow out ,immediately thereafter.").
142. See Sherman, supra note 9, at 664-66; B. BIrTKER, FEDERAL TAXATION OF IN-
COME, ESTATES & GIFrS 124.4.3 at 124-22 to 124-23 (1984); see supra notes 18 and
22 for definitions of future and present interests, respectively.
"entire legal and equitable title to the property."'" Therefore, a mere
power to withdraw assets from a trust cannot qualify as a present inter-
est.
Critics of this proposal contend that this alternative would encourage
taxpayers to seek different means of transferring gifts free of gift taxa-
tion.'44 For instance, a donor may transfer assets to several people
with the understanding that such people would transfer it to the intend-
ed beneficiary.'45 However, since recent cases have held that such at-
tempts to circumvent gift taxes constitute tax fraud, many taxpayers
will be more reluctant to use this method as a means of tax avoid-
ance.'46 Thus, confining the applicability of the annual exclusion to sit-
uations in which the donee receives the entire legal and equitable title
to the property can operate to cease such conspicuous misappropria-
tion of the annual exclusion.
B. Limiting the Utility of Crummey Trusts
A second alternative is to impose limitations on the utility of
Crummey Trusts. The Joint Committee on Taxation has suggested a
modification of the meaning of the term "present interest" for purposes
of the annual gift tax exclusion.'47 Based on this new definition, in or-
der for a gift coupled with a Crummey demand power to qualify for the
annual exclusion, the beneficiary must have the power to exercise his
withdrawal rights for life. '48 If this proposal is enacted into law, the
powerholder would have a continuing right of withdrawal over the
transferred property.' 4 Furthermore, this proposal would grant to the
beneficiary of the trust complete control over the trust assets and ter-
minate the grantor's ability to qualify a sham transfer as a conveyance
143. Sherman, supra note 9, at 664-66; see also Mason, supra note 34, at 598 (stat-
ing that "the creation of a general power of appointment in another-which is what
a demand right is-cannot give rise to an annual exclusion"); Dodge, supra note 86,
at 344 (stating that a general power of appointment should not be considered akin to
outright ownership of property, arguing that such reasoning "defies common sense").
144. Mason, supra note 34, at 598 ("the effect of the proposed rule is to channel
the evaders into-. . . alternative abuse[s]").
145. Id. This method of avoidance is commonly referred to as the "conduit meth-
od." Id.
146. See Heyen v. United States, 945 F.2d 359 (10th Cir. 1991).
147. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION WITH THE STAFF OF COMM. ON WAYS &
MEANS, 100TH CONG., 2D SESS., DESCRIPTION OF POSSIBLE OPTIONS TO INCREASE REvE-
NUES PREPARED FOR THE COMMrITEE ON WAYS AND MEANS 269 (Comm. Print 1987),
microformed on CIS No. 87-H782-24 (Congressional Info. Serv.) [hereinafter JOINT
COMM. PRINT].
148. Id. "Possible proposal[:] Require that the power of withdrawal last until the
death of the donee in order to characterize an interest as a present interest." Id.
149. Moore, supra note 35, at § 1106.
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of a present interest."5' The threat of the actual exercise of the de-
mand power in conjunction with the donor's loss of control over the
trust property would deter taxpayers from avoiding estate and gift taxa-
tion through such inter vivos transfers.
C. Applying a Substance Over Form Analysis
The third solution is to apply a substance over form analysis in deter-
mining whether an actual transfer of a present interest has occurred.
This test would require the court to analyze the surrounding circum-
stances to determine the character of the interest transferred. 5 ' If the
donee's right to demand the trust assets is unlikely to be exercised due
to a prior understanding with the donor, or due to basic obstacles, the
donee's right is, in essence, a "hollow" one. 2
Critics of this approach have argued that this tactic would afford the
courts too much discretion." Furthermore, given the tremendous eco-
nomic burdens associated with investigating the circumstances sur-
rounding each individual transaction, the Service has manifested a pref-
erence for avoiding such inquiry whenever possible." Although the
substance over form analysis of each individual transaction may encour-
age taxpayers to refrain from such manifest avoidance of taxes, the
administrative and economic difficulties associated with such a policy
make it an impractical solution.
150. JOINT COMM. PRINT, supra note 147, at 269. As a basis for its argument, the
Committee stated that the present interest requirement of the annual exclusion is
meant to ensure that the donee actually obtains control over the gift. Id. A second
basis for the proposal was that the Crummey withdrawal power is often used as a
means of avoiding gift or estate taxes. Id.; see also Pearle, supra note 109, at 52
("The real significance of this proposal ... [is] the shift of control that would result
from giving the powerholder a lifetime withdrawal power.").
151. This test was applied by the Supreme Court in two cases: Disston v. Commis-
sioner, 325 U.S. 442 (1945), and Fondren v. Commissioner, 324 U.S. 18 (1945).
152. Vlietstra, supra note 80, at 594. The article states that "[tihe gift of such a
specious interest is, in reality, no gift at all." Id.
153. See Crummey v. Commissioner, 397 F.2d 82, 88 (9th Cir. 1968).
154. Kathleen F. Bay, Crummey Powers, Annual Exclusions, and The Need For a
Continuing Interest In Trust, 2 PROB. & PROP. 10-11 (1988). Although the Service
may reach decisions by making factual determinations on each particular case, it pre-
fers a legal holding which could enable it to avoid being forced to consider the
surrounding circumstances in similar factual scenarios. Id. at 11.
D. Per Donor Annual Exclusion
The final approach proposed to terminate the use of the annual ex-
clusion for the purpose of substantial estate and gift tax avoidance is to
place limitations on the annual exclusion available to each individual
donor."n Recent Joint Committee on Taxation proposals have suggest-
ed that a $30,000 per donor limit be imposed on the availability of the
annual exclusion.'" Furthermore, in order to avoid creating a policy
which would characterize a society as one of tax evaders, an exclusion
may be established for de minimis transfers or transfers for "consump-
tion, support, or welfare."'57 This proposal discontinues the use of the
annual exclusion for gifts of "business property, real estate, life insur-
ance, annuity contracts or transfers into or through a trust," which are
in essence a transmission of wealth to successive generations."
In addition to terminating the manipulation of the annual exclusion
for gift and estate tax avoidance, this proposal recognizes and remedies
the inequity between cases involving donors with sizable families and
cases involving donors with smaller families. Under the per-donee ex-
clusion rule currently in effect, donors with large families may transfer
greater amounts of wealth free of estate and gift tax than donors with
smaller families.' 9 Furthermore, such donors are more capable of
avoiding the progressive estate tax rates through inter vivos transfers to
each donee."M Thus, replacing the per-donee annual exclusion with a
flat per-donor annual exclusion assists in preventing taxpayers from
155. Pennell, supra note 135, at § 13.1.
156. Joint Committee on Taxation, Staff Explanation of Miscellaneous Tax Proposals
Scheduled for Hearing Feb. 21-22 before House Ways and Means Committee's Sub-
committee on Select Revenue Measures, (JCS-4-90); see also Harrison, supra note 14,
at 376 (discussing the 1990 Joint Committee on Taxation Proposal); Warren G.
Lamont, Transfer to Partner Account Qualifies For Gift Exclusion, 17 EST. PLAN. 206
(1990) (discussing the use of the annual exclusion for transfer tax avoidance and the
possibility of preventing such tax avoidance techniques by converting to a per donor
annual exclusion).
157. Dodge, supra note 86, at 343-44. Dodge proposes a $5,000 per donee exclusion
for gifts of "consumable items," and "an unlimited exclusion for 'support type items'
(such as lodging, food, transportation, etc.)" provided to individuals who reside with
the donor. Id. Dodge also suggests an exclusion for educational expenses including
room and board, and an exclusion for medical expenses. Id.; see also K. Jay
Holdsworth et al., Report on Transfer Tax Restructuring, 41 TAx LAw. 395, 401
(1988) (discussing converting to a per donor annual exclusion); Milton L. Ray, The
Transfer-for-Consumption Problem: Support and the Gift Tax, 59 OR. L. REv. 425,
448-50 (1981) (discussing the enactment of transfer-for-consumption exclusion).
158. Dodge, supra note 86, at 344.
159. Mason, supra note 34, at 605.
160. See Sherman, supra note 9, at 674-75. (stating that the per donee annual
exclusion impairs the progressivity of the transfer tax system due to substantial inter
vivos transfers made by the wealthy).
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overtly abusing the annual exclusion as a means of tax avoidance.
Although the proposed solutions set forth above may cease the mis-
use of the annual exclusion for gift and estate tax avoidance, those
opposed to such revisions contend that current gift and estate tax bur-
dens imposed on beneficiaries already deter such evasive actions.'6'
The final portion of this Comment considers the tax burdens imposed
on the beneficiary, and the impact of such burdens on the donor's at-
tempts to secure cooperation.
V. ESTATE AND GIFT TAX CONSEQUENCES TO BENEFICIARIES
OF CRUMMEY TRUSTS RESULTING FROM THE LAPSE
A significant concern associated with Crummey Trusts are the accom-
panying estate and gift tax burdens imposed on powerholders upon the
lapse of the withdrawal power. Due to these burdens, the trustor may
have difficulty in securing participation in this tax avoidance plan."6
Although, these adverse tax consequences can be significant, sections
2514(e) and 2041(b)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code shield the greater
of $5,000 or five percent of the trust's assets, out of which the lapse
could have been exercised, from such unfavorable tax consequenc-
es.' 3 However, problems associated with the adverse tax consequenc-
es continue to exist despite the protection afforded by Internal Revenue
Code sections 2514 and 2041, because the amounts contributed to such
trusts generally exceed the amount shielded under the Code." The
161. Vlietstra, supra note 80, at 586 n.18.
162. Id. ("The possessor of a demand right does assume some burdens in holding
the right to withdraw, and therefore the trustor's ability to enlist cooperation in his
scheme may be limited to some extent.").
163. I.R.C. § 2514(e) provides in relevant part:
The lapse of a power of appointment . .'. during the life of the individual
possessing the power shall be considered a release of such power. The rule
of the preceding sentence shall apply with respect to the lapse of powers
during any calendar year only to the extent that the property which could
have been appointed by exercise of such lapsed powers exceeds in value the
greater of the following amounts:
(1) $5,000, or
(2) 5 percent of the aggregate value of the assets out of which, or the
proceeds of which, the exercise of the lapsed powers could be satisfied.
I.R.C. § 2514(e) (West 1992); see also Rev. Rul. 66-87, 1966-1 C.B. 217 (holding that the
five percent limitation on the lapsed power exclusion is based on the income the dece-
dent could have withdrawn from the trust rather than on the corpus of the trust).
164. See William Natbony,. The Crummey Trust and "Five and Five" Powers After
existence of this lapse problem has intensified due to the enactment of
the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, which increased the annual
exclusion from $3,000 to $10,000 without a corresponding increase in
the value of the lapse permitted under Internal Revenue Code §
2514." The adverse estate and gift tax consequences imposed on ben-
eficiaries has driven practitioners to create means of avoidance, that
permit taxpayers to obtain the benefits of Crummey Trusts without
bearing the costs.
A. Gift Tax Consequences to the Beneficiary
Failure to exercise a demand power may generate adverse gift tax
consequences for the beneficiary of a Crummey Trust. Under § 2514(c)
of the Internal Revenue Code, by virtue of the demand provision in the
trust, which may be exercised in favor of the beneficiary, the beneficia-
ry possesses a general power of appointment." The lapse of a power
of appointment is deemed to be a release of the power. 7 A release of
a power of appointment is considered a transfer of the property to the
other trust beneficiaries, thereby resulting in a taxable gift." Further-
ERTA, 60 TAXES 497, 499 (1982).
165. See supra note 16 and accompanying text for a discussion of modifications of
the annual exclusions; see also Natbony, supra note 164, at 497. Natbony states that:
An unintended effect of the enactment in the Economic Recovery Tax Act of
1981 ("ERTA") of an increase in the Section 2503(b) annual exclusion in-
volves the interaction of the gift tax annual exclusion and Crummey trust
powers with the gift and estate tax powers of appointment and grantor trust
rules. The seemingly innocuous change made by ERTA, raising the annual
exclusion from $3,000 per annum to $10,000 per annum, creates new com-
plexities in tax planning.
Id. Prior to the enactment of ERTA, donors could transfer a maximum of $6,000 (gift
splitting included) free of gift tax. Id. at 499. However, in order to come within the
limitation of §§ 2514(e) and 2041(b)(2), the transfer was limited to $5,000. Thus, the do-
nor was deprived of taking full advantage of the annual exclusion. Id. After ERTA,
donors may transfer a maximum of $20,000 free of gift tax. Id. The significant diver-
gence between the $20,000 annual exclusion and the $5,000 limitation has resulted in
new complications in tax planning. Id.
166. Section 2514(c) provides that a general power of appointment is the "power
which is exercisable in favor of the individual possessing the power .... his estate,
his creditors, or the creditors of the estate . . . ." I.R.C. § 2514(c) (West 1992).
167. Section 2514(e) of the Code provides that "[tihe lapse of a power of appoint-
ment created after October 21, 1942, during the life of the individual possessing the
power shall be considered a release of such power." I.R.C. § 2514(e) (West 1992). A
release is defined as a "complete, permanent, and unrestricted giving up of all power
of appointment over the property." Henry J. Lischer, The "Crummey Trust", 4 EST.,
GiFs & Tn. J. 17, 20 n.20 (1979).
168. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2514-3(c)(4) (as amended in 1986) (A beneficiary who
allows the lapse of the Crummey power is deemed to have made a gift transfer to
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more, such transfers would be characterized as gifts of future interests,
and thus not qualify for the annual gift tax exclusion." Therefore, if a
donor transfers $30,000 to a trust for the benefit of his three children
and grants to each of the beneficiaries a lapsing power to withdraw
$10,000, then upon the lapse of the withdrawal power each beneficiary
is considered to have made a taxable gift to the other beneficiaries of
the trust.
The lapse problem becomes more complicated where the beneficiary
of the Crummey Trust is a minor, because relevant Treasury Regula-
tions indicate that a beneficiary's incapacity as a minor prevents the
lapse of the demand power from being considered a taxable trans-
fer. '7 Despite the apparent meaning of this regulation, practitioners
generally hesitate to significantly rely on it because the "present interest
doctrine" requires that a legal guardian be available to compel distribu-
tion of the trust funds in favor of the minor beneficiary. 7' Thus, in
cases involving minor beneficiaries, similar to cases involving adult
beneficiaries, the lapse of the power of withdrawal effectively results in
a taxable gift being made to the other trust beneficiaries, thereby deter-
ring potential beneficiaries from taking part in this tax avoidance
scheme.
the other beneficiaries or remaindermen of the trust.). Section 2501 of the Code im-
poses a tax "on the transfer of property by gift." I.R.C. § 2501(a)(1) (West 1992). The
taxpayer has the burden of showing that a transfer does not give rise to gift tax
liability. Natbony, supra note 164, at 503.
169. Harris & Jacobson, supra note 28, at 206; Moore, supra note 35, at 1104.2.
For definitions of future interest, see supra note 18.
170. "In any case where the possessor of a general power of appointment is incapa-
ble of validly exercising or releasing a power, by reason of minority, or otherwise,
and the power may not be validly exercised or released on his behalf, the failure to
exercise or release the power is not a lapse of the power." Treas. Reg. § 25.2514-
3(c)(4) (as amended in 1986).
171. Edward D. Tarlow & Catherine M. Vacca, Recent Developments Clarify Tax
Effects of Lapse of Crummey Powers, But Problems Remain, 13 EST. PL 270-71
(1986); see also Rev. Rul. 73-405, 1973-2 C.B. 321. This ruling should be considered
when determining whether a taxable lapse has occurred in cases where the beneficia-
ry of the trust is a minor. The ruling states that in order for a contribution to a
trust to qualify as the transfer of a present interest, thereby, triggering the applicabili-
ty of the annual exclusion, there must be no impediment to the appointment of a
guardian. Id. Under these conditions, the incapacity will no longer be an issue be-
cause the guardian can exercise the demand power on behalf of the minor benefi-
ciary. Thus, the incapacity of the minor will not prevent the occurrence of a taxable
lapse. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2514-3(c)(4) (as amended in 1986).
1. Statutory Relief for the Lapse Dilemma
Sections 2514(e) and 2041(b)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code provide
relief for this lapse problem by stating that the lapse of a general power
of appointment is a taxable event only to the extent that the value of
the property subject to the power exceeds the greater of $5,000 or five
percent of the aggregate value of the trust's assets.'72 Thus, if a benefi-
ciary of the trust does not exercise his withdrawal power with respect
to a $5,000 contribution to the trust, he will not be subject to gift tax
liabilities."
This "five or five" power may be used by the beneficiary to escape
the negative tax consequences imposed on him. This device can be
utilized by limiting the demand power to the amount of $5,000 or five
percent of the trust assets."4 However, the five and five limit is an im-
pediment to a donor's aspiration to take complete advantage of the
annual exclusion through contribution of gifts equalling $10,000 (or
$20,000 if the spouse joins), unless the corpus of the trust exceeds
$200,000 (or $400,000 if both husband and wife are contributing to the
trust).' 5 For instance, A may transfer $20,000 to a trust for the benefit
172. I.R.C. § 2514(e) (West 1992); I.R.C. § 2041(b)(2) (West 1992). See supra note
163 for text of the statute; see also Richard B. Covey, The Estate Planning Benefits
Available Via A $5,000 and 5%" Withdrawal Power, 34 J. TAX'N 98 (1971) ("The
effect of these two statutes is to grant preferred treatment to a power of withdrawal
not in excess of the greater of $5,000 or 5% of the trust principal . . .in the sense
that the lapse of the power will not have any adverse estate or gift tax consequenc-
es.").
173. Under certain circumstances, if a powerholder receives more than one such
withdrawal power, the two powers must be combined for the purpose of determining
whether there has been a lapse in excess of the "five and five" restriction. The
Service has stated that in cases where multiple contributions are made to a single
trust for the powerholder's benefit, those powers will be aggregated. Rev. Rul. 85-88,
1985-2 CB 201. In addition, aggregation will occur if the grantor creates two different
trusts for the same beneficiary and grants to the beneficiary withdrawal powers with
respect to both trusts.. Id. The ruling stated that permitting multiple "five and five"
exemptions "would elevate form over substance." Id. In reaching this conclusion the
Service relied on the express language of § 2514(e), which states the five and five
exemption applies with respect to "lapse of powers during [the] calendar year." I.R.C.
§ 2514(e) (West 1992) (emphasis added); see also Lynn K. Pearle, New Rulings Affect
Use of Crummey Withdrawal Powers, 10 EST. GiFrs & TR. 179, 179-80 (1985) (dis-
cussing the impact of Revenue Ruling 85-88). This aggregation is not necessarily
detrimental to an estate plan, since it may result in beneficial consequences by
permitting aggregation of the principal of each trust for the purposes of determining
the five percent limitations. Roy M. Adams & Scott Bieber, Making "5 and 5" Equal
20: Crummey Powers after ERTA, 122 TR. & EsT. 22, 25 (1983).
174. Tarlow & Vacca, supra note 171, at 271.
175. See Benya, supra note 46, at 197 (stating that Crummey powers are often used
to establish a present interest equivalent to the annual exclusion).
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of his four children, and may grant to each child a lapsing power to
withdraw $5,000. The maximum amount that can be transferred while
avoiding imposition of gift taxes is $20,000-an amount significantly
less than the amount of $80,000 eligible for the annual exclusion (as-
suming gift splitting is available). The disparity between the $10,000
annual exclusion and the five and five exception has caused a great
deal of tension for estate planners who commonly used the five and
five rule as an avoidance device, thereby inducing them to pursue other
means of avoidance.
2. Additional Avoidance Devices
At first glance it may appear as though the tax burdens imposed on
the beneficiary of Crummey Trusts compensate for the grantor's ability
to avoid gift and estate tax laws through the creation of such trusts.
However, various methods have been used by tax practitioners to avoid
such adverse gift tax consequences on the power holder."6
A grantor may take full advantage of the annual exclusion to transfer
his estate free of estate and gift taxes, yet avoid the adverse tax conse-
quences imposed on the beneficiary by creating a one-beneficiary trust.
When the trust has only one beneficiary who will eventually be the
recipient of the trust corpus, the lapse of the power does not result in
the transfer of property to others.' Therefore, no gift tax liability will
result.'7"
176. John Freeman Blake, Drafting Five or Five Powers for Maximum Flexibility,
14 TAX'N FOR LAW. 126 (1985) ("[A] major goal of proper drafting is to assure that
the lapse of the power is not treated as a gift by the beneficiary, and to assure that
the amount includible in the beneficiary-decedent's estate is limited.")
177. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 81-42-061 (July 21, 1981). When "the trust instrument provides
that the sole-beneficiary or his estate will receive the trust-corpus, . . . the lapse of
the annual demand right (or its release) will not result in a taxable gift . . . ." Id.;
see also Pearle, supra note 173, at 180 ("If a trust is created for the benefit of one
beneficiary, with that beneficiary or his estate as the ultimate taker, there will be no
gift tax consequences under § 2014(e) upon the lapse of a withdrawal power because
the beneficiary's lapsed power favors his own estate.")
178. Several disadvantages are associated with using single-beneficiary trusts as a
method of avoiding the adverse gift tax consequences imposed on the beneficiary.
First, if the beneficiary dies intestate, trust property may revert to the trustor under
the state's intestacy statute, thereby eradicating the benefits of the transfer. Tarlow &
Vacca, supra note 171, at 271. Second, creating separate trusts for multiple benefi-
ciaries increases economic and administrative burdens. Id. Third, the trust corpus will
be included in the beneficiaries' gross estate under § 2033 of the Code, which states
Another method often employed to avoid gift taxes is the hanging
power of withdrawal.'" Taxpayers may avoid gift tax liability by draft-
ing the trust documents so that the demand right lapses only to the
extent that the amount subject to demand exceeds the greater of $5,000
or five percent of the trust assets.'" Thus, the demand power in ex-
cess of the section 2514 exception remains outstanding. For example, a
donor may transfer $10,000 in trust for the benefit of his child and limit
the lapse in that year to the greater of $5,000 or five percent of the
trust corpus. Since the power of withdrawal has not lapsed, no transfer
has occurred thereby eliminating imposition of gift taxes. 8' Donors
commonly utilize this technique with respect to young donees, since
they can allow the power to remain outstanding without apprehension
of unwanted exercises of Crummey demand rights.'" However, since
the prolongation of the demand right period may cause the creator of
the trust to suffer anxiety based on the possibility that the beneficiary
that "[tihe value of the gross estate shall include the value of all property to the
extent of interest therein of the decedent at the time of his death." I.R.C. § 2033
(West 1992).
179. Richard Covey, Use of Hanging Powers, PRACTICAL DRAFTING, Oct. 1982, at 77.
180. Tarlow & Vacca, supra note 171, at 271; see also Emily F. Johnson, Estate
Planning Issues in a Matrimonial Practice, in WHAT MATRIMONIAL LAWYERS NEED To
KNOw ABoUT BANKRuPTcy, TAX AND CORPORATE LAW ISSUES (PLI Tax Law & Estate
Planning Course Handbook Series No. 61, 1992), available in Westlaw, File No. 214
PL/EST 61 ("[T]he portion of the power in excess of '5 and 5' does not lapse in the
year in which it arises and, instead, 'hangs' until it can lapse without exceeding the
'5 and 5' amount.")
181. Johnson, supra note 180, at 61. There are several drawbacks connected with
the use of the hanging power of withdrawal as a method of gift tax avoidance. In
cases involving adult beneficiaries, the length of time this power is outstanding may
entice the beneficiary to exercise such power. Moore, supra note 35, at 1104.2.
This may also cause the beneficiary to be taxed on a greater portion of the trust's
income than he would have been had the power lapsed within a specific period of
time. Id.
Under certain circumstances, the Service has questioned the validity of "hanging
powers" as a method of gift tax avoidance. Tech. Adv. Mem. 89-01-004 (Sept. 16,
1988). This decision was based on the fact that the primary purpose of the hanging
power was to evade imposition of federal gift taxes. Id. However, the hanging power
in that case provided that "if upon the termination of any power of withdrawal, the
person holding the power will be deemed to have made a taxable gift for federal gift
tax purposes," then a portion of the power would not lapse. Id. The Service's rejec-
tion of such use of "hanging powers" was based on public policy grounds. Id. (citing
Commissioner v. Procter, 142 F.2d 824 (4th Cir. 1944)). Several reasons were provid-
ed for the contention that the use of hanging powers are contrary to public policy.
First, tax officials would be deterred from seeking collection of the taxes because
such an attempt would simply void the gift. Id. Also, this would require courts to
render judgments with respect to moot questions. Id.
182. Rotherberg, supra note 35, at 325.
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may exercise his demand right,"s donors prefer other tax avoidance
devices.
The next alternative for avoiding the adverse gift tax consequences
imposed on the beneficiary of a Crummey Trust is to grant the benefi-
ciary a testamentary power of appointment. Upon lapse of the with-
drawal power, the beneficiary is considered to have conveyed an inter-
est in the trust property, thus resulting in a taxable gift. " A testamen-
tary power of appointment prevents the occurrence of the shifting of
interest, thereby escaping the taxable transfer.'" The beneficiary of a
Crummey Trust who holds a testamentary power of appointment can
control the identity of the ultimate recipients of the trust assets by
designating, by will only, who those recipients will be." Relevant reg-
ulations state that when a beneficiary of the trust retains the power to
dispose of the property, the purported conveyance is considered an
incomplete gift.'87 Since the beneficiary holds the power of disposition
over the property, a completed gift will not occur and a gift tax will not
be imposed."
However, this avoidance device has negative estate tax consequences.
If the beneficiary dies during the period in which the general power of
appointment over the trust property is outstanding, then all of the prop-
erty will be included in the beneficiary's gross estate.'" Such adverse
183. Moore, supra note 35, at 1104.2.
184. See supra notes 166-69 and accompanying text.
185. Adams & Bieber, supra note 173, at 23.
186. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 82-29-097 (April 22, 1982). When the trust beneficiaries are em-
powered to appoint the trust assets through a testamentary transaction, they have re-
tained "dominion and control" over the trust property, thereby thwarting the gift. Id.
187. The regulations on this issue state that "if upon a transfer of property (wheth-
er in trust or otherwise) the donor reserves any power over its disposition, the gift
may be wholly incomplete, or may be partially complete and partially incomplete, de-
pending upon all the facts in the particular case." Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(b) (as
amended in 1983); see also Sanford's Estate v. Commissioner, 308 U.S. 39, 43-44
(1939) (holding that the donor's retention of power to revoke or alter the terms of
the trust and the donor's ability to modify the ultimate beneficiaries of the trust
prevents the completion of the gift, thereby avoiding imposition of gift taxation);
Harris & Jacobson, supra note 28, at 208 (discussing the impact of granting a testa-
mentary power of appointment to trust beneficiaries).
188. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(b) (as amended in 1983).
189. Section 2041 of the Code provides, in relevant part:
The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all property . . .[tjo
the extent of any property with respect to which the decedent has at the
time of his death a general power of appointment created after October 21,
estate tax consequences can also be defeated by granting a special
power of appointment to the trust beneficiary, as opposed to a general
power of appointment." A special power of appointment allows the
beneficiary to select a specified class of beneficiaries as the ultimate
recipients of the trust assets, for example, his spouse or children.'
This power will make the gift incomplete and will reduce the potential
estate tax liability imposed upon the beneficiary's death." Thus, a
special power can operate as an effective method by which one can
avoid the imposition of gift tax upon the lapse of the withdrawal pow-
er, and contemporaneously reduce the risk of inclusion of trust proper-
ty in the beneficiary's taxable estate.
Although the imposition of the gift tax liabilities on the beneficiaries
of Crummey Trusts may initially deter individuals from cooperating in
the donor's tax avoidance scheme, the use of the many avoidance de-
vices at the disposal of estate planners makes such adverse tax conse-
quences virtually disappear. However, in addition to such negative gift
tax consequences, estate planners must consider the estate tax conse-
quences imposed on the beneficiaries.
B. Estate Tax Consequences
The holder of a Crummey demand power may also suffer adverse
1942, or with respect to which the decedent has at any time exercised or re-
leased such a power of appointment by a disposition which is of such nature
that if it were a transfer of property owned by the decedent, such property
would be includible in the decedent's gross estate under sections 2035-2038,
inclusive.
I.R.C. § 2041 (West 1992).
190. Adams & Bieber, supra note 173, at 23 (stating that a special power of ap-
pointment could be utilized in lieu of a general power of appointment in order to
minimize the impact of the negative estate tax consequences on the trust beneficiary).
191. A special power of appointment is "a power that could be exercised in favor
of persons, not including the donee, who constituted a group not unreasonably large,
if the donor did not manifest an intent to create or reserve the power primarily for
the benefit of the donee." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 11.4 (1986).
192. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(c) (as amended in 1983). This regulation provides that
a gift is incomplete to the extent that the beneficiary has the power to designate the
ultimate recipients of the trust's assets. Id. If a primary beneficiary, holding a special
power of appointment, passes away while the power remains outstanding, only a frac-
tion of the trust assets subject to the power of appointment will be included in the
primary beneficiary's estate. Id. The numerator of such fraction is the amount by
which the portion lapsed exceeds the "five or five" limitations. The denominator of
the fraction is the value of the beneficiary's trust share at the date of death or the
alternate valuation date. The amount included in the estate would be calculated by
multiplying the fraction by the value of beneficiary's share in the trust at the date of
death or alternate valuation date. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2041-3(d)(4) and (5) (as
amended in 1986); see also Adams and Bieber, supra note 173, at 23-24.
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estate tax consequences by holding a general power of appointment
over the trust property. If the beneficiary owns the trust property at
death due to termination of the trust, then pursuant to section 2033 of
the Code, the trust property will be included in the beneficiary's gross
estate.'" Additionally, if the beneficiary dies prior to the termination
of the trust, and the trust instrument provides that the trust property be
distributed to the estate of the beneficiary, section 2033 mandates the
inclusion of the trust property in the beneficiary's taxable estate.'
Even if the trust property is not included in the beneficiary's gross
estate under section 2033, section 2041 may operate to cause such in-
clusion. Under section 2041(a)(2), the gross estate of a decedent benefi-
ciary includes the value of demand rights held at the time of death."
Thus, if the trust instrument provides a beneficiary with a Crummey
power, and the beneficiary dies while the power is operative, the value
of the property subject to the demand right will be included in his gross
estate. The Service has stated that this rule applies to minors incapable
of exercising their demand power." Applicable case law supports the
Service's position on this issue, stating that property subject to power
of appointment will be included in the gross estate, despite the incom-
petency of the powerholder.1 7
Furthermore, the value of lapsed demand rights may also be included
in the decedent's gross estate." This situation will arise if the nature
193. Section 2033 of the Code states: "The value of the gross estate shall include
the value of all property to the extent of the interest therein of the decedent at the
time of his death." I.R.C. § 2033 (West 1992).
194. See id.
195. Section 2041 provides that the value of property subject to a general power of
appointment is included in the powerholder's gross estate. I.R.C. § 2041(a)(2) (West
1992).
196. Rev. Rul. 75-351, 1975-2 C.B. 368. This ruling stated that "the value of trust
assets at the date of the beneficiary's death is includible in the beneficiary's gross
estate under the provisions of section 2041(a)(2) of the Code, even though, under the
applicable local law, the beneficiary was legally incompetent to execute a will from
the date of creation of the trust until the date of death." Id.
197. Estate of Rosenblatt v. Commissioner, 633 F.2d 176, 181 (10th Cir. 1980); Fish
v. United States, 432 F.2d 1278, 1280 (9th Cir. 1970); Boeving v. United States, 650
F.2d 493, 495 (8th Cir. 1981); Williams v. United States, 634 F.2d 894, 894 (5th Cir.
1981). But see Finley v. United States, 404 F. Supp. 200, 203 (S.D. Fla. 1975) (holding
that the incompetency of the powerholder prevents him from possessing the power of
appointment; therefore, the appointive property will not be included in his gross es-
tate).
198. Section 2041(a)(2) provides that the gross estate of the decedent shall include
the value of all property to which the decedent released a general power of appoint-
of the transfer is such that if it were a transfer of property owned by
the powerholder, it would be includible in the powerholder's gross
estate under Internal Revenue Code sections 2035 (three year rule),'9
2036 (retained life estate),' 2037 (transfers taking effect at death),'
or 2038 (revocable transfers).' Additionally, section 2041 requires that
the lapse of a general power of appointment be considered a transfer
for purposes of sections 2035 through 2038.'m
However, the gravity of estate tax burdens imposed on the beneficia-
ries generally are not of such significance to dissuade the donees from
taking part in this tax avoidance scheme. First, the donee's power to
compel distribution of the funds is ordinarily outstanding only for a
period of less than two months.' Second, donors tend to choose
young donees, thus reducing the likelihood that the donee will pass
ment. I.R.C. § 2041(a)(2) (West 1992). This allows the decedent to continue holding
the property in a manner that would have resulted in the property's inclusion under
§§ 2035-2038 if the decedent had made the transfer directly.
199. Section 2035 of the Code provides that "the value of the gross estate shall
include the value of all property to the extent of any interest therein of which the
decedent has at any time made a transfer, by trust or otherwise, during the 3-year
period ending on the date of the decedent's death." I.R.C. § 2035(a) (West 1992).
200. Under § 2036 of the Code, the gross estate of the decedent includes the value
of property transferred by the decedent if he retains the right to income from the
property. I.R.C. § 2036 (West 1992). Thus, if the beneficiary has an income interest in
the trust and allows a general power of appointment to lapse, the property subject to
the power will be included in his gross estate. Id.
201. Section 2037 of the Code provides:
The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all property to the
extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has . . . made a trans-
fer... if
(1) possession or enjoyment of the property can, through ownership of
such interest, be obtained only by surviving the decedent, and
(2) the decedent has retained a reversionary interest in the property...
and the value of such reversionary interest immediately before the death
of the decedent exceeds 5 percent of the value of such property.
I.R.C. § 2037 (West 1992).
202. Section 2038 of the Code provides:
The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all property . . . [t]o
the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has at any time
made a transfer . . . by trust or otherwise, where the enjoyment thereof was
subject at the date of his death to any change through the exercise of a
power . . . by the decedent alone or . . . in conjunction with any other per-
son . . . , to alter, amend, revoke, or terminate, or where any such power is
relinquished during the 3-year period ending on the date of the decedent's
death.
I.R.C. § 2038 (West 1992).
203. I.R.C. § 2041(a)(2) (West 1992).
204. Mason, supra note 34, at 593 n.64.
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away before the termination of the trust."n Third, since most donees
have small estates, the estate will not be taxed based on the unified
credit.' Furthermore, section 2041(b)(2) excludes the greater of
$5,000 or five percent of the trust's assets from inclusion in the gross
estate of a decedent."7 Therefore, the estate tax burdens imposed on
the beneficiary do not appear to be so serious as to deter one from
aiding the donor in his endeavor to escape estate and gift tax liability.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Crummey Trust is the common technique by which individuals
exploit the annual exclusion, transferring substantial amounts of wealth
to successive generations free of estate and gift taxation. Such use of
the annual exclusion displays extreme disregard for the value of prece-
dent due to the failure to give effect to the substance of the transaction
as opposed to the legal form. Additionally, Crummey Trusts undermine
the underlying policies of the annual exclusion by permitting it to be
used as a vehicle for estate tax avoidance. Furthermore, expanding the
class of beneficiaries eligible for Crummey Trusts to include those pos-
sessing a mere contingent remainder in the trust transforms such trusts
into a much more powerful and useful device for transfer tax avoidance
205. Id.
206. Id. Section 2010 of the Code provides that "[a] credit of $192,800 shall be
allowed to the estate of every decedent against the tax imposed by section 2001."
I.R.C. § 2010 (West 1992). Thus, the first $600,000 of an estate can pass through free
of estate tax. Id.; see also Moore, supra note 35, at 1104.3. Moore states that in
the event that such trust property were included in the powerholder's estate, the
application of the unified credit and applicable deduction would render the inclusion
immaterial for purposes of estate taxation. Id. This would most likely occur with
respect to young beneficiaries who had no significant assets subject to estate taxa-
tion. Id.
207. I.R.C. § 2041(b)(2) (West 1992). Section 2041(b)(2) provides:
The lapse of a power of appointment created after October 21, 1942, during
the life of the individual possessing the power shall be considered a release
of such power. The preceding sentence shall apply with respect to the lapse
of powers during any calendar year only to the extent that the property,
which could have been appointed by exercise of such lapsed powers, exceed-
ed in value, at the time of such lapse, the greater of the following amounts:
(A) $5,000, or
(B) 5 percent of the aggregate value, at the time of such lapse, of the
assets out of which, or the proceeds of which, the exercise of the
lapsed powers could have been satisfied.
Id.
than originally contemplated. Tolerating the continued vitality of such
trusts is judicial acquiescence to a sham which frustrates the purposes
of the estate and gift tax laws.
Given such blatant abuse of the annual exclusion for purposes of gift
and estate tax avoidance, a revision in the tax law is necessary to deter
taxpayers from engaging in such tax avoidance schemes. The current
estate and gift tax burdens imposed on the beneficiary do not accom-
plish this objective due to the many avoidance devices at the disposal
of estate planners, each of which results in the mitigation of such ad-
verse tax consequences. Such deterrence objectives may be accom-
plished through the elimination of Crummey Trusts, the limitation of
the utility of such trusts, or the conversion to a per-donor exclusion
system. The adoption of such alternative proposals will result in the
ultimate invalidation of the Crummey Trust.
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